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Abstract
This study empirically investigates how the presence of CETA (Comprehensive Eco-
nomic and Trade Agreement) may affect per capita emissions of four air pollutants. It
follows closely the empirical work of (Qirjo et al., 2019), but it focuses in each cate-
gory of GHGs. It finds statistically significant evidence suggesting that trade openness
between the EU and Canada could help reduce per capita emissions of CO2, CH4, and
N2O in a typical CETA member, respectively. In the case of CO2, the presence of CETA
may help reduce per capita emissions in almost all CETA members. However, there
is empirical evidence that suggests that per capita emissions of CH4 could move from
the EU towards Canada due to the implementation of CETA. There is also empirical
evidence implying that there could be a shift of emissions per capita of N2O from
Canada towards 8 former EU members due to the implementation of CETA. There is
mainly statistically insignificant evidence of a positive relationship between trade in-
tensity of each EU member and Canada and per capita emissions of HFCs/PFCs/SF6.
Furthermore, the study reports unambiguous empirical evidence in support of Pollu-
tion Haven Hypothesis originating from national population density variations (PHH2)
for Canada, in the case of CH4. Moreover, there is also clear evidence consistent to the
Pollution Haven Hypothesis due to national income differences (PHH1) for 8 former
Communist EU members, in the cases of N2O and HFCs/PFCs/SF6.
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1 Introduction
This study follows closely the empirical work of (Qirjo et al., 2019), but it focuses on
each of the four main categories of GHGs. Consequently, using a panel dataset of 28
current EU members and Canada over the 1990-2016 time period, the paper investigates
the impacts of higher trade intensity between trade partners on per capita emissions of
four air pollutants; CO2, CH4, HFCs/PFCs/SF6, and N2O, respectively.
The study provides robust and statistically significant evidence suggesting that higher
trade intensity between each EU member and Canada could help reduce, on average, per
capita emissions of CO2, CH4, and N2O, respectively. In particular, holding everything
else constant, it yields robust and strongly statistically significant evidence suggesting that
one percent increase of a percentage point of the ratio of bilateral trade between each
EU member and Canada to GDP, may help reduce annual per capita emissions of CO2,
CH4, and N2O, by about .46 percent, .65 percent, and 1.2 percent, respectively. It also
shows that the the presence of CETA (Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement)
may help reduce per capita emissions of CO2 in almost all CETA members. There is no
statistically significant evidence of an increase of CO2 for any CETA member, regardless
of the empirical strategy or model employed in the paper. However, there is statistically
significant evidence suggesting that per capita emissions of CH4, and N2O would increase
in 7 CETA members and in 9 EU members, respectively, due to more trade between the
EU and Canada. These results stand despite the statistically significant evidence of an
negative relationship between the trade intensity variable and each of emissions per capita
of these 2 air pollutants. Moreover, the study also indicates that there is a positive but
mainly not statistically significant evidence between the trade intensity variable and per
capita emissions of HFCs/PFCs/SF6. More specifically, holding everything else constant,
on average, one percent increase of a percentage point of bilateral trade between Canada
and a typical EU member as a portion of GDP may help increase per capita emissions of
HFCs/PFCs/SF6 by about 1.95%.
The above result for CO2 stands because FEH (Factor Endowment Hypothesis based
on the Heckscher-Ohlin theory) and PHH2 (Pollution Haven Hypothesis based on an in-
verse measurement of population density variations) appear to dominate PHH1 (Pollution
Haven Hypothesis based on national per capita income differences). An average EU mem-
ber is poorer, but very densely populated relative to Canada. In particular, there are 17 EU
members that are poorer than Canada, but each EU member is extremely more densely
populated than Canada. Thus, following PHH1, a poor EU member may act as a pollution
haven because it may adapt lax environmental laws (or simple less effective ways over
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the execution of similar environmental rules and regulations) due to higher trade intensity
with Canada. On the other hand, simultaneously, Canada may act as a pollution haven
because it is extremely sparsely populated as compared to each CETA member, and there-
fore, may adapt lax air pollution regulations due to the presence of CETA. Moreover, in
Canada, FEH may further increase national air pollution because it is a capital-abundant
country relative to a typical EU member. In the sample, there are 15 EU members that
are labor-abundant and 13 EU members that are capital-abundant. However, the empiri-
cal results imply that for Canada, PHH1 cancels out FEH and PHH2. In other words, the
implementation of CETA would have a statistically insignificant impact on per capita emis-
sions of CO2 for Canada, but it may help decrease per capita emissions of CO2 in a typical
EU member. Consequently, there is not shift of emissions per capita of CO2 from the EU
towards Canada even though per capita emissions of CO2 would generally go down in the
EU due to the implementation of CETA.
In the cases of CH4 and N2O, there is empirical evidence implying that FEH and PHH2
dominate PHH1 for a typical EU member. This domination is also true for Canada, but only
in the case of CH4. However, PHH1 dominates FEH and PHH2 for Canada in the case of
N2O. The results of the study imply that one would expect a shift of emissions per capita of
CH4 from the EU towards Canada due to the implementation of CETA. And, a movement
of emissions per capita of N2O from Canada towards 8 former Communist EU members as
a consequence of the implementation of CETA. The results of the paper suggest that this
movement of these two air pollutants from one trade region to the other follows PHH2 for
CH4 and PHH1 for N2O. Note that Canada is very sparsely populated as compared to each
EU member and a typical EU member is poorer than Canada (where a former Communist
EU member is much poorer than Canada).
There is generally no statistically significant evidence of a relationship between the
trade intensity variable and per capita emissions of HFCs/PFCs/SF6 under most of the
models and empirical strategies used in this paper. This implies that PHH1 cancels out
FEH and PHH2 for an average EU member due to more trade with Canada. However,
there is limited empirical evidence (only under M2 when employing the fixed effects with
cross-sectional robust standard errors technique) implying that PHH1 dominates FEH and
PHH2, not only for an average EU member, but also for Canada. In other words, there is a
shift of emissions per capita of HFCs/PFCs/SF6 from Canada towards a typical EU member
due to more trade between these two regions. The result of the paper suggest that the
latter result stands mainly because an average EU members is poorer than Canada.
This study provides unambiguous empirical evidence in support of PHH1 and PHH2 as
a result of more trade between Canada and the EU. It could be worth noting that this is the
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only study, to the best of our knowledge, that provides clear empirical evidence in support
of the pollution haven argument originating from national population density variations
(PHH2), following the work of Frankel and Rose (2005). CETA provides an ideal case
of analyzing the empirical validity of PHH2 since Canada is extremely sparsely populated
as compared to each EU member. The results of the paper suggest strongly statistically
significant evidence consistent to PHH2 for CH4 due to the implementation of CETA (see
the estimates of trade elasticities of CH4 emissions per capita reported in Table 9). This
is more apparent for Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Finland, France,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Sweden.
Thus, higher trade between each of these 15 EU members and Canada may help these EU
members to stringent their air policy regulations for CH4 following PHH2. At the same
time, more trade between these 15 EU members and Canada may force Canada to adopt
lax environmental rules and regulations for CH4, and therefore, act as pollution haven
consistent to PHH2. Put it differently, the implementation of CETA shifts pollution of CH4
from each of these 15 EU towards Canada following PHH2.
The results of this study suggest that there is empirical evidence in support of PHH1 for
N2O and HFCs/PFCs/SF6 (see the estimates of trade elasticities of N2O and HFCs/PFCs/SF6
emissions per capita reported in Tables 10 & 11, respectively). This is very apparent, for
both pollutants, in some former Communist EU members that are each much poorer than
Canada (such as Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Roma-
nia), but also in other poor EU members such as Malta for HFCs/PFCs/SF6. Consequently,
for both these pollutants, each of these 8 former Communist EU members (or Malta for
HFCs/PFCs/SF6) will act as pollution haven when trading more with Canada simply be-
cause they are poorer than Canada, and therefore, may have/adopt lax environmental
rules and regulations (or simply a poor execution of the environmental rules and regula-
tions). Put it differently, the implementation of CETA may help increase per capita emis-
sions of N2O and HFCs/PFCs/SF6 in these former EU members because pollution would
shift from Canada towards these EU members.
The study derives the above results by employing 3 econometric models (M1, M2,
& M3) and using 4 empirical methodologies for each of these 3 models. In particular, in
addition to the usual fixed and random effects methods, the paper employs the fixed effects
technique controlling for robust cross-sectional dependence standard errors terms, and the
fixed effects specification controlling for robust serial-correlation dependence (Driscoll-
Kraay, under MA(2) component) standard errors terms. M1 evaluates the role of trade
intensity on pollution in the presence of PHH1 and FEH, but in the absence of PHH2. M2
looks at the role of trade intensity on pollution in the presence of PHH1, PHH2, and FEH.
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M3 tests the effect of trade intensity on pollution in the presence of PHH1, PHH2, and FEH,
but also adds 3 dummy variables that are closely related to the trade intensity variable.
All three models also include a set of control variables that are commonly used in this
literature.
From the policy point of view, it could be important to emphasize the empirical validity
of PHH2 and PHH1, when evaluating the environmental impacts of CETA. This is related
to the fact that CETA already have two separate chapters that attempt to emphasize the
possible environmental impacts of this trade agreement. It is worth noting that there 16
articles of chapter 24 entitled “Trade and Environment” , where one of the main goals is
to eliminate any possible pollution haven for any CETA member associated to the trade
agreement.1 The empirical results of this paper do not provide any clues for curing the
potential disease of pollution havens due to the implementation of CETA, but they attempt
to provide some empirical evidence over the general diagnosis of this disease (pollution
haven) that could be created/worsen, due to the implementation of CETA. Looking at the
various documents of CETA that are publicly available in the official EU and Canada web-
sites, there are no clear details on what type of mechanism the EU and Canada would take
in eliminating these pollution havens (maybe using second best policies such as various
trade barriers of goods (productive activities) associated with these pollutants, or first best
policies, such enforcing higher environmental standards in the countries that are poten-
tial candidates of pollution havens for these pollutants, or the introduction of pollution
taxes for these pollutants only in CETA members that are potential candidates of pollution
havens).
The main objective of this paper is to follow-up the empirical study of Qirjo et al. (2019)
by focusing on the impacts of higher trade intensity between the EU and Canada on each of
the main four air pollutants that are part of GHGs, instead on focusing on GHGs in general.
In this light, the study highlights the similarities and differences between the former paper
and the current one. The main results of this empirical study confirm the main result of
(Qirjo et al., 2019), who provide robust and statistically significant evidence that suggest
a negative relationship between the trade intensity and per capita emissions of GHGs due
to the presence of CETA. The main result of this paper confirms the latter result for CO2,
CH4, and N2O, respectively. However, this is not the case for HFCs/PFCs/SF6, where the
1See http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-by-chapter/. Chapter 24 entitled
“Trade and Environment” and chapter 22 entitled “Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD)” are
the two chapters that deal with possible consequences of CETA on environment. On Septem-
ber, 13 2018, EU and Canadian committee members of TSD, have met to discuss progress
on the procedure and institutional structures for the effective implementation of TSD chap-
ters and exchange views on priority areas of trade and environment. For more details see
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/september/tradoc_157409.pdf.
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results imply a positive, but mainly statistically insignificant, relationship between per
capita emissions of HFCs/PFCs/SF6 and trade intensity variable.
Qirjo et al. (2019) show that there is no shift of emissions per capita of GHGs between
the EU and Canada due to the implementation of CETA. This is also the case for CO2,
where we find that there is no statistically significant evidence of a positive relationship
between per capita emissions of CO2 and the trade intensity variable between Canada and
each EU member. It could be worth noting that in our dataset 75% of GHGs come from
CO2 and the other three pollutants make in total only 25% of GHGs. However, the results
of the present study show that the picture may seem pretty green for each CETA member
when looking at either GHGs in general or CO2. However, this is not the case for CH4, N2O,
and HFCs/PFCs/SF6 despite the fact that per capita emissions of CH4 and N2O go down
in a typical CETA member. The results of this paper suggest that there is a movement of
emissions per capita of HFCs/PFCs/SF6 (N2O) from Canada towards a typical EU member
(9 EU members) due to the implementation of CETA. There is also a shift of emissions per
capita of CH4 from an average EU member towards Canada due to more trade between
these two regions.
The current paper is analogous to Qirjo and Pascalau (2019b) and Qirjo and Pascalau
(2019a) studies. These two latter studies empirically investigate the impacts of the po-
tential Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) on several pollutants. They
use a panel dataset of 28 EU and the US during 1989-2013 time period. They provide
statistically significant evidence indicating a negative (positive) relationship between the
trade intensity variable and per capita emissions of GHGs, CO2, N2O, and HFCs/PFCs/SF6
(SO2, SOx, NOx, SF6, and NH3), respectively, for a typical EU member. Similar to the
results of this study, the possible implementation of TTIP may help reduce per capita
emissions of GHGs and CO2, but simultaneously may also help increase per capita emis-
sions of other pollutants. The main difference between the empirical results of the cur-
rent study to Qirjo and Pascalau (2019a) is that the implementation of CETA may help
increase per capita emissions of HFCs/PFCs/SF6 (however, this is mainly statistically in-
significant), but the possible implementation of TTIP may help decrease per capita emis-
sions of HFCs/PFCs/SF6. Another difference between the latter paper and the current one,
lies on the clear evidence of the presence of PHH2 due to the implementation of CETA,
while the presence of PHH2 is less apparent in the case of TTIP. Note that either the US
or Canada are sparsely populated, rich and capital-abundant as compared to a typical EU
member. However, Canada is very sparsely populated than each EU member, while the
US is sparsely populated than an average EU member (that are 3 EU members that are
more sparsely populated than the US). This latter fact could explain why Canada may act
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as pollution haven due to the implementation of CETA following PPH2, while this is less
apparent in the case of the US as a results of a possible implementation of TTIP. Using
an analogous intuition, one may also explain the clear evidence of the presence of FEH in
the TTIP as reported in Qirjo and Pascalau (2019b). Something that is less apparent in
the current study. Qirjo and Pascalau (2019b) show that there is a shift of emissions per
capita of GHGs and CO2, respectively, from an average EU member towards the US, mainly
because of FEH, due to the possible implementation of TTIP. However, this is not the case
for Canada when focusing on these two air pollutants as a result of the implementation of
CETA. This could be related to the fact that the US is much more capital-abundant as com-
pared to an average EU member than there is Canada when compared to the same average
EU member. Note that there are 13 EU members that are capital-abundant and 15 labor-
abundant EU members as compared to Canada, but there are only 3 EU members that are
capital-abundant as compared to the US (all the rest 25 EU members are labor-abundant
as compared to the US).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset and its
sources, section 3 discusses the empirical results, and section 4 presents conclusions.
2 Data Description of Air Pollutants and their Sources
Carbon Dioxide is denoted by CO2. This is the most discussed and cited air pollutant from
all GHGs in regards to climate change. In the sample, CO2 accounts for about 75% of all
GHGs on average, for the EU and Canada during 1990 to 2016 time period. The unit of
measurement for Carbon Dioxide is in Kiloton (Kt) per capita emissions. About 87 % of the
anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide emissions originate from the burning of fossil fuels such as
coal, oil and natural gas. Approximately 10 % of the anthropogenic CO2 emissions comes
from the clearing of forests and other land use changes, and the rest of it originates from
various industrial process, such as the manufacturing of cement.
Methane is denoted by CH4. The data for CH4 are expressed in Kt in CO2 equivalent
per capita emissions. It is worth noting that despite the fact that CH4’s lifetime in the
atmosphere is much shorter than CO2, the comparative impact of the former air pollutant
on climate change is about 25 times greater than the later air pollutant over a 100 years
period. Also, note that almost 80% of methane originates from agriculture activities. The
rest comes from waste from landfills, coal mining, and long-distance gas transmission.
The Fluorinated Gasses are denoted either by HFCs/PFCs/SF6 or simply F-Gasses, where
HFCs stands for hydrofluorocarbons, PFCs stands for perfluorocarbons, and SF6 stands for
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Table 1: Data Sources of Air Pollutants and their unit of measurement
Variable Source Unit of Measurement
CO2(Carbon Dioxide) UNFCCC (2019) Kt per capita
CH4(Methane) UNFCCC (2019) Kt in CO2 equiv. per capita
HFCs/PFCs/SF6 UNFCCC (2019) Kt in CO2 equiv. per capita
N2O (Nitrous Oxide) UNFCCC (2019) t in CO2 equiv. per capita
sulfur hexafluoride. Note that the F-Gasses originate solely from human related activities
and they are the most potent and longest lasted type of GHGs emitted by human activities.
The major emissions source of HFCs is their application in refrigerators, or in air condition-
ing systems. PFCs are produced as a byproduct of several aluminum and/or manufacturing
of semiconductor’s industrial production processes. SF6 is the most potent of the F-Gasses
in terms of its contribution to global warming. SF6 is applied mainly in the various produc-
tion processes of magnesium and/or electronics. HFCs/PFCs/SF6’s unit of measurement is
in Kt in CO2 equivalent per capita emissions.
Nitrous Oxide, also known as the laughing gas, is denoted by N2O. The primary source
of N2O from human activities originates from agriculture activities, primarily related to
animal wastes, cultivation and fertilizers. It also comes from industrial activities related
to manufacturing of nylon and nitric acid, and the burning of fossil fuels. Nitrous Oxide’s
unit of measurement is in tons (t) in CO2 equivalent per capita emissions.
The data for all of the above four air pollutants are obtained from UNFCCC (2019).
Note that, the data for each of the four air pollutant is without LULUC. Table 2 reports
a statistical description of the four exogenous, air pollution variables. It also shows a
unit root (Im-Pesharan-Shin) test for each air pollutant, respectively. Each of the four air
pollutant appears to be stationary when controlling simply for a trend, or a trend and its
squared trend term, respectively. All the endogenous variables employed in this study are
explained in the data section of Qirjo et al. (2019). See also their Table 2 for details on
their statistical descriptions.
3 Empirical Results
The paper follows closely the empirical applications employed in Qirjo et al. (2019). The
average impact of higher trade intensity between the EU and Canada on per capita emis-
sions of CO2, CH4, HFCs/PFCs/SF6, and N2O are shown in Tables 4 through 7, respectively.
Each of these Tables, reports the estimation results for all models and empirical methods
employed in the study. The Column located furthers to the left presents the label of each of
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the endogenous variables. Columns (1), (2) and (3) show the results for the air pollutant
when applying the fixed effects specification with robust heteroskedastic standard errors
terms for models 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Columns (4), (5) and (6) report the results for
the air pollutant when employing the random effects with robust heteroskedastic errors
terms for models 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Columns (7), (8) and (9) indicate the results
for the air pollutant when using the fixed effects specification controlling for robust cross-
sectional dependence standard errors terms for models 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Columns
(10), (11) and (12) report the results for the air pollutant when applying the fixed effects
method controlling for robust serial-correlation dependence (Driscoll-Kraay, under MA(2)
component) standard errors terms for Models 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
Model 1 (M1) evaluates the role of trade intensity on pollution in the presence of PHH1
and FEH, but in the absence of PHH2. Model 2 (M2) looks at the role of trade intensity
on pollution in the presence of PHH1, PHH2, and FEH. Model 3 (M3) tests the effect of
trade intensity on pollution in the presence of PHH1, PHH2, and FEH, but also adds certain
dummy variables that are closely related to the trade intensity variable (originating from
the gravity and trade literature, such as use of the same official language, or common
currency, or access to the sea). All three models also include a set of control variables such
as: the three year moving average of income per capita (that we simply refer as income per
capita); its squared value; the capital to labor ratio; the product of income per capita and
capital to labor ratio; the inward FDI between Canada and each EU member to GDP ratio;
land per capita; and its squared value. For more details, on each of the three econometric
models see Qirjo et al. (2019).
The main variable of interest is the trade intensity variable labeled as Trade. This
variable is constructed as the ratio of the volume of trade (sum of exports and imports)
between each EU member and Canada to GDP.2 The trade intensity variable is reported in
the 1st row of Tables 4 through 7. This variable along with its covariates is used to measure
the overall impact of trade openness between the EU and Canada on each of the four air
pollutants. The results reported in Table 4 show robust and strongly statistically significant
evidence suggesting a negative relationship between the trade intensity variable and per
capita emissions of CO2. This is an important result of this paper, since it shows that the
presence of CETA could be along the forces that combat global warming, since CO2 is
considered the most prominent anthropogenic air pollutant. This result is consistent with
2Mathematically, in the EU member i, the trade variable that is denoted with Ti, is constructed as: Ti =
Xi+Mi
GDPi
, where Xi and Mi denote the EU member’s i exports and imports to and from Canada, respectively.
In the case of Canada (CAN), TCAN =
XCAN+MCAN
GDPCAN
, where XCAN = ∑
28
i Mi and MCAN = ∑
28
i Xi are all the
exports and imports of Canada to and from the EU, respectively.
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Qirjo et al. (2019) where they analyze the impacts of GHGs in general in the presence of
CETA. It is also consistent with Pascalau and Qirjo (2017a) or Qirjo and Pascalau (2019b),
where they empirically analyze the impacts of TTIP on per capita emissions of GHGs and
CO2, respectively. The current study finds positive but mainly statistically insignificant
evidence of a positive relationship between the trade variable and the F-Gasses (see Table
7). The results of F-Gasses of the current study is contrary to those of Qirjo and Pascalau
(2019a), where they show a generally negative and statistically significant relationship
between the trade intensity variable and per capita emissions of the F-Gasses.
Despite the fact that Tables 5 & 6 show mixed and mainly statistical insignificant re-
sults of the role of trade on per capita emissions of CH4 and N2O, respectively, the results
of Tables 9 & 10 (where as explained later in this section, we look at the overall trade elas-
ticity of each of these two pollutants) suggest a strong statistically significant evidence of
a negative relationship between trade intensity and per capita emissions of CH4 and N2O,
respectively. Hence, overall, one may conclude that the main force behind the negative
relationship between trade intensity and per capita emissions of GHGs as found in Qirjo
et al. (2019) is related to the negative impact of trade intensity on per capita emissions of
CO2 that it is shown in this study. Please note that CO2 consists of about 3/4 of all GHGs
and the other three pollutants consist of only 1/4 of GHGs all together.
Results reported in the first row of Table 4, report that, on average, holding everything
else constant, 1% increase of the volume of trade between each EU member and Canada
as a portion of GDP, could help reduce annual per capita emissions of CO2 by about 244 Kt.
This result is robust and statistically significant independent of the model or the empirical
methodology used in the paper. Consequently, one may suggest that the presence of CETA
could be associated with the race to top argument, implying that more trade between the
EU and Canada is associated with an improvement of the national air pollution regulations
for CO2 in trade members. In other words, the implementation of CETA could be an ally
in fight against global warming in almost all CETA members because it may help reduce
per capita emissions of CO2. The above results stand because of the combinations of
PHH1, PHH2 and FEH in a typical EU member as a result of the presence of CETA. Note
that an average EU member is labor-abundant, poor and extremely densely populated
as compared to Canada. As reported in Table 3, there are 15 EU members that are labor-
abundant, 17 EU members that are rich, and none of the EU members is sparsely populated
as compared to Canada.
The study uses the product of the trade intensity variable and relative capital to la-
bor ratio, denoted by Trade x RKL, and its squared term to measure its diminishing re-
turns, denoted by Trade x (RKL)2, in order to capture FEH. The coefficients associated
10
with these two variables are reported in the 2nd and 3rd rows of Tables 4-7, respectively.
The relative capital to labor ratio (RKL) is constructed relative to Canada (that in this
case has a RKL=1). Thus, a capital-abundant (labor-abundant) EU member has a RKL>1
(RKL<1). Theoretically, consistent to FEH, the presence of CETA would increase air pol-
lution in capital-abundant EU members, but reduce it in labor-abundant EU members.3
This is related to the application of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory and the empirical liter-
ature that suggests that capital-intensive goods pollute the environment more than the
labor-intensive ones.4 Observing the signs of the slopes of Trade x RKL and Trade x (RKL)2,
there is some limited evidence of the presence of FEH due to the implementation of CETA.
This is more apparent for CO2 when using M1 under the fixed effects method with robust
serial-dependence (Driscoll-Kraay) standard errors. For the other three pollutants, the es-
timates of Trade x RKL are mainly positive but never statistically significant regardless of
the model or empirical approach used in this paper.
The paper employs the cross-product of trade intensity and relative income per capita
(RI), denoted by Trade x RI, and its squared term, denoted by Trade x (RI)2 to capture its
diminishing returns, in order to measure PHH1. The slopes related to these two variables
are reported in the 5th and 6th rows of Tables 4-7, respectively. RI is built subject to Canada
(thus, Canada has RI=1). Put it differently, a poor EU member has a RI<1, while a rich EU
member has a RI>1. It is worth noting that in order to avoid the possible dual causality
issue between income per capita (I) and per capita emissions of each air pollutant, re-
spectively (and also to avoid multicollinearity issues between per capita income and the
trade intensity variable along with its covariates) I is constructed as the three-year lagged
moving average of real GDP per capita.5 Theoretically, PHH1 implies that poor countries
adopt lax air pollution regulations and policies, and therefore, produce pollution-intensive
goods, while rich countries adopt stringent air pollution policies, and thus, produce envi-
ronmentally clean-intensive goods.6 Hence, a higher trade intensity between Canada and
the poor EU due to the presence of CETA, may force the later EU members to act as pollu-
tion havens. Or, a higher trade intensity between Canada and the rich EU members, due to
the presence of CETA, may force Canada to act as pollution haven. On average, observing
3See Antweiler et al. (2001), Davis and Caldeira (2010), Qirjo and Christopherson (2016), Qirjo and
Pascalau (2019b), and Qirjo et al. (2019), who among others, provide empirical evidence consistent with
FEH.
4There is plenty of empirical research that empirically validate the claim the capital-intensive goods are
more pollution-intensive goods as compared to the labor-intensive ones (e.g., Jaffe et al. (1995), Cole and
Elliott (2003)).
5Mathematically, we use the following weighting scheme when constructing the three-years lagged mov-
ing average of income per capita: Iit = .6 ∗ Iit−1 + .3 ∗ Iit−2 + .1 ∗ Iit−3.
6See Levinson and Taylor (2008), Cole and Fredriksson (2009) and Qirjo and Pascalau (2019b) who
among others, find empirical evidence in support of PHH1.
11
the signs of the coefficients of Trade x RI and Trade x (RI)2, there is some evidence over the
presence of PHH1. This is more apparent for N2O when using M2 & M3 under the fixed
effects method with robust serial-dependence (Driscoll-Kraay) standard errors, and for the
F-Gasses when using M1 under the fixed effects method with robust serial-dependence
(Driscoll-Kraay) standard errors. For CO2, the estimates of Trade x RI are never statistically
significant regardless of the model or empirical approach used in this paper.
The study uses the cross-product of trade intensity and relative land per capita (RLPC),
denoted by Trade x RLPC, and its squared term, denoted by Trade x (RLPC)2 to measure
its diminishing returns, in order to capture PHH2. The coefficients of the later two vari-
ables are reported in the 11th and 12th rows of Tables 4-7, respectively. The RLPC of each
EU member is expressed relative to Canada (Thus, Canada has RLPC=1). Since every EU
member is more densely populated relative to Canada, each EU member’s RLPC is less
than 1. PHH2 argues that the presence of CETA may reallocate the production of pollution
intensive goods from densely populated EU members towards the very sparsely populated
Canada. Therefore, Canada may act as pollution haven due to the implementation of
CETA.7 The signs of Trade x RLPC and Trade x (RLPC)2 suggest evidence in accordance to
PHH2 for three air pollutants. In particular, for CO2, the estimates of Trade x RLPC are pos-
itive and statistically significant only under M2 when using the simple fixed effects or the
random effects or the fixed effects with cross sectional dependence standard error terms
techniques. In the case of N2O, the estimates of Trade x RLPC are positive and statistically
significant only under M2 & M3 when using the simple fixed effects or the random effects
or the fixed effects with cross sectional dependence standard error terms techniques, and
when using M3 under the fixed effects method with robust serial-dependence (Driscoll-
Kraay) standard errors. In the case of the F-Gasses, the estimates of Trade x RLPC are
positive and statistically significant only under M2 & M3 when using the simple fixed ef-
fects or the fixed effects with cross sectional dependence standard error terms or the fixed
effects with robust serial-dependence (Driscoll-Kraay) standard errors techniques. Conse-
quently, on average, EU members that are more densely populated tend to decrease per
capita emissions of CO2, N2O, and the F-Gasses, respectively, as they increase their trade
intensity levels with Canada. In other words, the implementation of CETA may help in-
crease per capita emissions of CO2, N2O, and the F-Gasses, respectively, in Canada since
the latter trade member is more sparsely populated than any EU member. Hence, Canada
may act as a pollution haven due to the presence of CETA for these three air pollutants.
7Frankel and Rose (2005) was the first empirical study to evaluate the possible presence of PHH2. Qirjo
and Pascalau (2019b) and Qirjo et al. (2019) find some empirical evidence consistent with PHH2 in the cases
of TTIP and CETA, respectively.
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Following the work of Antweiler et al. (2001), this study builds trade elasticities in or-
der to measure the overall impact of the trade intensity variable on per capita emissions
of each pollutant, not only in total (as an average) but also in each CETA member (see
also the analogous Table 4 of Qirjo et al. (2019) in the case of GHGs in general). The
slopes of these trade elasticities are reported in Tables 8-11, where each CETA member is
listed alphabetically in the furthest left column. The last row of each of Tables 8-11, re-
ports the trade elasticity coefficients in a typical CETA member. Columns (1), (2) and (3)
show the trade elasticities when employing M1 under fixed effects, random effects, and
fixed effects with cross-sectional dependence robust standard errors, respectively. Note
that, Tables 8-11 do not report the trade elasticities associated with the fixed effects with
serial-correlation (Driscoll-Kraay) robust standard errors because they are extremely simi-
lar to those under fixed effects with cross-sectional dependence robust standard errors for
any model used in the paper. Columns (4), (5) and (6) show the trade elasticities when
employing M2 under fixed effects, random effects, and fixed effects with cross-sectional
dependence robust standard errors, respectively. Finally, columns (7), (8) and (9) show
the trade elasticities when employing M3 under fixed effects, random effects, and fixed
effects with cross-sectional dependence robust standard errors, respectively. All the results
reported in Tables 8-11 are in percentage points.
Each trade elasticity is constructed using the Delta method. In Table 8, each of them
shows exactly how much does per capita emissions of CO2 change when the ratio of the
volume of trade to GDP increases by .0001. The study uses such small changes because the
average value of the trade intensity variable in the sample is about .057%. As expected,
there is statistically significant evidence (however, it is not statistically significant only
when using M2, or when employing M3 only under random effects), suggesting that an
increase of 0.01% of the ratio of trade between a typical EU member and Canada to GDP,
could help reduce annual per capita emissions of CO2, in an average CETA member, by
about .476%. It is worth noting that according to the results reported in Table 8, there is
no CETA member that has a positive and statistically significant trade elasticity slope with
the exception of Finland, where it is positive and statistically significant only when using
M2 under random effects. This result indicates that there is no statistically significant
evidence that the presence of CETA may increase per capita emissions of CO2 in some
CETA member even though, it decreases them on average. In other words, there is no
statistically significant evidence supporting the argument that there could be a shift of CO2
per capita emissions between trade partners due to the presence of CETA.
The results of Table 8, show that trade elasticities are mainly negative for most CETA
members, with the exceptions of Canada, Finland and Slovenia (however, for the later 3
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countries, they are not statistically significant). In the cases, of Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Romania, Spain, and the UK trade elas-
ticity coefficients are negative and generally strongly statistically significant. The results
of Table 8 also point out that despite the fact that trade elasticities are mainly negative,
they are mainly not statistically significant for Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Germany, Greece,
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Sweden.
Note that M1 evaluates the effects of trade intensity between trade members on air
pollution only in the presence of PHH1 and FEH along with the control variables. M2 in
addition to all variables used in M1, introduces PHH2. Thus, it could be important to
compare the trade elasticities of M1 to those of M2 in terms of their magnitude, sign and
statistically significance. Remember that Canada is very sparsely populated as compared
to each EU member. Thus, according to PHH2, Canada may adopt lax environmental
regulations when trading more with each EU member. Therefore, per capita emissions of
CO2 may increase in Canada due to the presence of CETA. Looking at the signs of trade
elasticities for Canada when using M1 as compared to those when using M2, it is apparent
that trade elasticities become positive under M2, while they were negative under M1 for
every empirical method used in the study. However, they are never statistically significant
for any model or empirical specification used in the study. Comparing the trade elasticities
of M1 to those of M2, it could be worth noting that they become higher in absolute value
(remaining negative) under the later model as compared to the former one, for Belgium
and Luxembourg. This could imply that higher trade between Canada and each of the later
two EU members could force them to stringent their air policy regulations even further
following PHH2, and therefore, reduce per capita emissions of CO2 even more.
Focusing on the trade elasticities coefficients associated solely to M1, it turns out that
there is statistically significant evidence suggesting that FEH dominates PHH1 for Bulgaria,
Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, and Romania, respectively.
This is related to the fact that each of the later EU members is labor-abundant and poor
as compared to Canada. Thus, theoretically one can not predict the effects of higher
trade intensity between these EU members and Canada on air pollution. This is because
the later EU members would produce more labor-intensive goods following FEH, but at
the same time, they have lax air pollution regulations as compared to Canada following
PHH1. However, the negative and strong statistically significant trade elasticities indicate
that in each of the later EU members, being labor-abundant is more important than being
poor in reducing air pollution due to higher trade between them and Canada.
It appears that Luxembourg is the only rich and capital-abundant EU member, where
there is statistically significant evidence suggesting that PHH1 dominates FEH. In other
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words, Luxembourg reduces per capita emissions of CO2 due to higher trade intensity with
Canada because being rich for the later EU member seems more important than being
capital-abundant. In other 7 EU members that are rich and capital-abundant, all trade
elasticities are negative, but they are never statistically significant, respectively, regardless
of the empirical method used in the paper. This suggests that in the later EU members
PHH1 cancels out FEH. It turns out that there is no evidence supporting the argument that
per capita emissions of CO2 would increase in each capital-abundant but poor EU member
due to the presence of CETA, along the lines of FEH and PHH1. Table 8, reports negative
trade elasticities for each rich and labor-abundant EU member confirming the argument
that per capita emissions of CO2 should decrease in the later EU members due to the
presence of CETA. However, they are never statistically significant under each empirical
specification used in the study. Finally in the case of Canada, it appears that under M1, all
coefficients of trade elasticities are negative. However, they are never statistically signif-
icant. Therefore, since Canada is capital-abundant and rich as compared to a typical EU
member, it should be that PHH1 cancels out FEH.
Comparing the trade elasticities of CO2 reported in Table 8 of this study to the anal-
ogous trade elasticities of GHGs presented in Table 4 of Qirjo et al. (2019), it is worth
noting the similarities and differences between them. Both Tables indicate robust and sta-
tistically significant evidence suggesting, on average, a negative relationship between per
capita emissions of each of the latter two air pollutants and the trade intensity variable.
However, trade elasticities associated with GHGs are higher in magnitude and always sta-
tistically significant, regardless of the model or empirical specification used in the study,
as compared to trade elasticities of CO2. Moreover, it appears that trade elasticities are
generally negative in each EU member (with the exception of Finland that is positive but
not statistically significant), but they are mainly statistically significant only in 8 EU mem-
bers for each of the two air pollutants. In the case of Canada, they are generally positive,
but never statistically significant. In the case of GHGs, trade elasticities are negative and
generally statistically significant for 8 Western European EU members, where 5 of them
are capital-abundant and rich, 1 is labor-abundant and rich, 1 is labor-abundant but poor,
and 1 is capital-abundant but poor. While, in the case of CO2, trade elasticities are neg-
ative and mainly statistically significant for 4 Ex-Communist EU members and 4 Western
EU members, where 5 of them are labor-abundant and poor, 2 are capital-abundant and
rich, and 1 is capital-abundant but poor. The latter two results imply that in the case of
GHGs, one of the main reasons why per capita emissions of GHGs go down in the presence
of CETA, could be because the rich EU members may adopt stringent air pollution regu-
lation and policies, despite of being capital-abundant, while Canada simultaneously does
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not drop them due to the presence of CETA. On the other hand, in the case of CO2, the
main reason why per capita emissions of CO2 go down, could be related to the fact that
more capital-intensive goods are produced in rich but capital-abundant Canada, while
more labor-abundant goods are produced in labor-abundant and poor EU members due to
higher trade intensity between the EU and Canada. In other words, per capita emissions
of CO2 go down because the production of capital-intensive goods move from the poor
EU members (mainly Ex-Communist EU members) into rich Canada that may use more
environmental friendly technologies than the latter EU members.
Table 9 presents the trade elasticities for each CETA member and the average total trade
elasticities for a typical CETA member in the case of CH4. Similarly to the results of Table
8, the results of Table 9 show strongly statistically significant evidence, regardless of the
model or empirical technique used in this study, implying that an increase of 0.01% of the
volume of trade between a typical EU member and Canada to GDP ratio, could help reduce
annual per capita emissions of CH4, in a typical CETA member, by about .65%. It is worth
noting that according to the results reported in Table 9, contrary to the results of Table 8,
there are several CETA member that have positive and statistically significant trade elas-
ticity slopes. These CETA members are Bulgaria (where the trade elasticity coefficients are
positive and statistically significant only under M3 when employing the fixed and random
effects methodologies), Canada (where the trade elasticity coefficients are positive and
statistically significant under M2 & M3 regardless of the empirical techniques used in the
study), Hungary (where the trade elasticity coefficients are positive and statistically signif-
icant only under M3 when employing the fixed effects with the cross-sectional dependence
of the robust standard error terms methodology), Malta (where the trade elasticity coef-
ficients are positive and statistically significant under M1 when employing the fixed and
random effects methodologies and under M2 regardless of the empirical technique used in
the paper), Poland (where the trade elasticity coefficients are positive and statistically sig-
nificant under M2 & M3 regardless of the empirical techniques used in the study), Romania
(where the trade elasticity coefficients are positive and statistically significant only under
M3 when employing the simple fixed effects methodology), and Spain (where the trade
elasticity coefficients are positive and statistically significant only under M3 when employ-
ing the fixed effects with the cross-sectional dependence of the robust standard error terms
methodology). These results indicate that there is statistically significant evidence that the
presence of CETA increases per capita emissions of CH4 in these CETA members, despite
the fact that the implementation of CETA decreases per capita emissions of CH4 in an aver-
age CETA member. In other words, there is statistically significant evidence supporting the
argument that there could be a shift of CH4 per capita emissions between trade partners
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due to the presence of CETA.
The results of Table 9, show that trade elasticities are mainly negative for most CETA
members, with the exceptions of countries mentioned in the previous paragraph. In par-
ticular, for Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Sweden trade elasticity co-
efficients are negative and generally strongly statistically significant. The results of Table
9 also point out that despite the fact that trade elasticities are mainly negative, they are
mainly not statistically significant for Estonia, the Netherlands, and the UK.
In order to see the potential of Canada acting as a pollution haven following PHH2
argument due to the implementation of CETA, it could be important to compare the trade
elasticities of M1 to those of M2 in terms of their magnitude, sign and statistically signifi-
cance. Note that Canada is very sparsely populated as compared to each EU member. Thus,
according to PHH2, Canada may adopt lax environmental regulations when trading more
with each EU member. Therefore, per capita emissions of CH4 may increase in Canada
due to the presence of CETA. Looking at the signs of trade elasticities for Canada when us-
ing M1 as compared to those when using M2, it is apparent that trade elasticities become
positive and strongly statistical significant under M2 (& M3), regardless of the empirical
methodology used in this paper, while they are negative, but not statistically significant un-
der M1 for every empirical method used in the study. This is an important finding because
it suggests that in the case of CH4, Canada may act as pollution haven when trading more
with the EU because it is very sparsely populated as compared to each EU member. In
Canada for CH4, PHH2 strongly dominates PHH1. In other words, for Canada being more
densely populated dominates being rich, and therefore, one observes higher per capita
emissions of CH4, when Canada trades more with the EU forcing to former trade partner
to act as pollution haven. Comparing the trade elasticities of M1 to those of M2, it could
be worth noting that they become higher in absolute value (remaining negative) under
the later model as compared to the former one, for Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Re-
public, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovakia,
Slovenia, and Sweden. This could imply that higher trade between Canada and each of
these 15 EU members could force them to stringent their air policy regulations even fur-
ther following PHH2, and therefore, reduce per capita emissions of CH4 even more. These
results indicate that an important reason why Canada may act as pollution haven for CH4,
when trading more with the latter 15 EU members is related to the fact that Canada is very
sparsely populated as compared to each of these 15 EU members. Put it differently, PHH2
shifts pollution of CH4 towards Canada as a result of trading more with each of the latter
EU members.
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It appears that Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, and Luxembourg are the only rich
and capital-abundant EU members, where there is statistically significant evidence suggest-
ing that PHH1 dominates FEH. In other words, these 5 EU members reduce per capita emis-
sions of CH4 due to higher trade intensity with Canada, respectively, because being rich
for each of the later 5 EU members seems more important than being capital-abundant.
It turns out that similar to the case of CO2, there is no evidence supporting the argument
that per capita emissions of CH4 would increase in each capital-abundant but poor EU
member due to the presence of CETA, along the lines of FEH and PHH1. Looking at the es-
timates under M1, Table 9 reports negative and statistically significant trade elasticities for
Ireland that is richer and labor-abundant EU member as compared to Canada. This find-
ing supports the theoretical argument that the implementation of CETA should decrease
pollution in labor abundant and rich trade members following by the combination of FEH
and PHH1. However, there is no empirical evidence suggesting that the latter theory is
true for the other 2 EU members (the Netherlands and the UK) that are also richer and
labor-abundant as compared to Canada.
Comparing the trade elasticities of CH4 reported in Table 9 of this study to the anal-
ogous trade elasticities of GHGs presented in Table 4 of Qirjo et al. (2019), one can see
the similarities and differences between them. Both Tables indicate robust and statistically
significant evidence, regardless of the model or empirical specification used in the study,
suggesting on average, a negative relationship between per capita emissions of each of
these 2 air pollutants and the trade intensity variable. However, trade elasticities associ-
ated with GHGs are lower in magnitude as compared to trade elasticities of CH4. Moreover,
it appears that trade elasticities for GHGs are generally negative (and statistically signifi-
cant for most EU members) in each EU member, but they are never positive and statistically
significant for any CETA member. On the other hand, in the case of CH4, Table 9, reports
positive and statistically significant trade elasticity estimates for Bulgaria, Canada, Hun-
gary, Malta, Poland, Romania, and Spain. The case of Canada is important because it
suggests that there is a shift of emissions per capita of CH4 from most EU members to-
wards Canada due to more trade between these trade partners. Something that is never
the case for GHGs. Table 9 presents solid statistical evidence in support of PHH2 for CH4,
that is not that apparent (at least not statistically significant) for GHGs.
Table 10 presents the trade elasticities for each CETA member and the average total
trade elasticities for a typical CETA member in the case of N2O. Similarly to the results
of Tables 8 & 9, the results of Table 10 show strongly statistically significant evidence,
regardless of the model or empirical technique used in this study, implying that an in-
crease of 0.01% of the volume of trade between a typical EU member and Canada to
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GDP ratio, could help reduce annual per capita emissions of N2O, in a typical CETA mem-
ber, by about 1.2%. It is worth noting that according to the results reported in Table 10,
there are several CETA member that have positive and statistically significant trade elas-
ticity slopes. These CETA members are Bulgaria (where the trade elasticity coefficients
are positive and statistically significant only under M2 when employing the fixed and ran-
dom effects methodologies), Croatia (where the trade elasticity coefficients are positive
and statistically significant under M2, regardless of the empirical techniques used in the
study), Estonia (where the trade elasticity coefficients are positive and statistically signif-
icant under M2&M3, regardless of the empirical techniques used in the study), Hungary
(where the trade elasticity coefficients are positive and statistically significant only under
M2 when employing the simple fixed effects and the fixed effects with the cross-sectional
dependence of the robust standard error terms methodologies), Latvia (where the trade
elasticity coefficients are positive and statistically significant under M2, regardless of the
empirical technique used in the paper and under M3 when employing the fixed and ran-
dom effects methodologies), Lithuania (where the trade elasticity coefficients are positive
and statistically significant under M2 & M3 regardless of the empirical techniques used
in the study), Poland (where the trade elasticity coefficients are positive and statistically
significant under M2 when employing the fixed and random effects methodologies), Ro-
mania (where the trade elasticity coefficients are positive and statistically significant under
M2 when employing the fixed and random effects methodologies), and Spain (where the
trade elasticity coefficients are positive and statistically significant under M2, regardless
of the empirical techniques used in the study). These results indicate that there is sta-
tistically significant evidence that the presence of CETA increases per capita emissions of
N2O in these EU members, despite the fact that the implementation of CETA decreases per
capita emissions of N2O in an average CETA member. Consequently, there is statistically
significant evidence supporting the argument that there could be a shift of N2O per capita
emissions from Canada towards these 9 EU members due to the presence of CETA.
The results of Table 10, show that trade elasticities of N2O are mainly negative for most
CETA members, with the exceptions of countries mentioned in the previous paragraph. In
particular, for Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia,
and the UK trade elasticity coefficients are negative and generally strongly statistically sig-
nificant. It could be worth noting that this result in Canada could be true because PHH1
dominates FEH. This is because Canada is rich and capital-abundant as compared to a
typical EU member. The empirical results of Table 10 imply that, for Canada, being rich
is more important than being capital-abundant in order to reduce per capita emissions of
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N2O due to more trade with the EU. Using the same intuition, one may note that the above
results could be true in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, and Luxembourg
because PHH1 dominates FEH. Note that each of these 6 EU members are rich and capital-
abundant as compared to Canada. Analogously to Canada, the empirical results of Table
10 imply that, for each of these 6 EU members, being rich is more important than being
capital-abundant in order to reduce per capita emissions of N2O due to more trade with
Canada. The results of Table 10 also indicate that although trade elasticities are mainly
negative, they are mainly not statistically significant for Finland, Malta, and Sweden.
Comparing the trade elasticities of M1 to those of M2 in terms of their magnitude, sign
and statistically significance, there is some weak empirical evidence in support of PHH2.
Remember that Canada is very sparsely populated as compared to each EU member. Thus,
according to PHH2, Canada may adopt lax environmental regulations when trading more
with each EU member. Therefore, per capita emissions of N2O may increase in Canada
due to the presence of CETA. Looking at the statistically significance of trade elasticities
for Canada when using M1 as compared to those when using M2, it is apparent that trade
elasticities become statistically insignificant under M2 (however, they are still negative)
when using fixed and random effects techniques, while they are statistically significant and
negative under M1, regardless of the empirical methodology used in the study. Comparing
the trade elasticities of M1 to those of M2, it could be worth noting that they become higher
in absolute value (remaining negative) under the later model as compared to the former
one, for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
This could imply that higher trade between Canada and each of these 7 EU members
could force them to stringent their air policy regulations even further following PHH2, and
therefore, reduce per capita emissions of N2O even more than it is explained via the PHH1
channel.
It appears that contrary to the cases of CO2 and CH4, there is some empirical evidence
supporting the theoretical argument that per capita emissions of N2O would increase in
capital-abundant but poor EU members due to the presence of CETA, following the chan-
nels of FEH and PHH1. However, this is true only for Spain, but it is not the case for Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Greece, and Italy. Looking at the estimates under M1, Table 10 reports
negative and statistically significant trade elasticities for Ireland, the Netherlands, and the
UK that are each richer and labor-abundant EU member as compared to Canada. This find-
ing supports the theoretical argument that the implementation of CETA should decrease
pollution in labor abundant and rich trade members following by the combination of FEH
and PHH1.
Comparing the trade elasticities of N2O reported in Table 10 of this study to the anal-
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ogous trade elasticities of GHGs presented in Table 4 of Qirjo et al. (2019), one can see
the similarities and differences between them. Both Tables indicate robust and statistically
significant evidence, regardless of the model or empirical specification used in the study,
suggesting on average, a negative relationship between per capita emissions of each of
these 2 air pollutants and the trade intensity variable. However, trade elasticities associ-
ated with GHGs are lower in magnitude as compared to trade elasticities of N2O. Moreover,
it appears that trade elasticities for GHGs are generally negative (and statistically signifi-
cant for most EU members) in each EU member, but they are never positive and statistically
significant for any CETA member. However, for N2O, Table 10, reports positive and statis-
tically significant trade elasticity estimates for Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Spain. The latter result suggests that for N2O, there is a
shift of pollution from Canada towards these 9 EU members due to more trade between
these trade partners. In other words, this result implies that these 9 EU members would
act as pollution haven when trading more with Canada because they are poor despite of
being labor-abundant (with the exception of Spain that is poor and capital-abundant).
Hence, this result validates the empirical validity of PHH1 for these EU members (with the
exception of Spain) in the case of N2O. This is never the case for GHGs.
Table 11 presents the trade elasticities for each CETA member and the average total
trade elasticities for a typical CETA member in the case of F-Gasses. Contrary to the results
of Tables 8, 9, & 10 the results of Table 10 indicate no statistically significant evidence (with
the exception of the use of M2 under the fixed effects with cross-sectional dependence ro-
bust standard errors, where there is positive and statistically significant evidence of the av-
erage total trade elasticity coefficient) implying that an increase of 0.01% of the volume of
trade between a typical EU member and Canada to GDP ratio, could help increase annual
per capita emissions of F-Gasses, in a typical CETA member, by about 0.73%. It is worth
noting that according to the results reported in Table 11, there are several CETA member
that have negative and statistically significant trade elasticity slopes. These CETA members
are Austria (where the trade elasticity coefficients are negative and statistically significant
under M1 when employing the fixed effects with cross-sectional dependence robust stan-
dard errors technique, and under M3 when using the random effects technique), Belgium
(where the trade elasticity coefficients are negative and statistically significant under M1,
regardless of the empirical technique used in the paper, and under M2 when employing the
fixed effects with cross-sectional dependence robust standard errors technique, and under
M3 when using the random effects and the fixed effects with cross-sectional dependence
robust standard errors methodologies), Canada (where the trade elasticity coefficients are
negative and statistically significant under M1&M2 when employing the fixed effects with
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cross-sectional dependence robust standard errors technique), Cyprus (where the trade
elasticity coefficients are negative and statistically significant under M1 when employing
the simple fixed effects and the fixed effects with cross-sectional dependence robust stan-
dard errors methodologies, and under M3, regardless of the empirical technique used in
the study), Czech Republic, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Slovakia (where the trade
elasticity coefficients for each of these 5 EU members are negative and statistically signifi-
cant only under M3 when employing the random effects methodology), Greece (where the
trade elasticity coefficients are negative and statistically significant under M3, regardless
of the empirical technique used in the paper), Italy (where the trade elasticity coefficients
are negative and statistically significant regardless of the model and empirical technique
used in the paper with the exception of M2 under fixed effects technique), Portugal, Slove-
nia (where the trade elasticity coefficients in each of these 2 EU members are negative and
statistically significant under M3 when using random effects and fixed effects with cross-
sectional dependence robust standard errors methodologies), and the UK (where the trade
elasticity coefficients are negative and statistically significant under M3 when employing
the random effects). These results indicate that there is statistically significant evidence
that the presence of CETA decreases per capita emissions of F-Gasses in these 14 EU mem-
bers, despite the fact that the implementation of CETA increases per capita emissions of
F-Gasses in an average CETA member.
The results of Table 11, show that trade elasticities of F-Gasses are mainly positive for
the rest of the EU members that are not mentioned in the previous paragraph. In particular,
for Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Roma-
nia, Spain, and Sweden trade elasticity coefficients are positive and generally strongly sta-
tistically significant. It could be worth noting that for the former Communist EU members
(such as Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania) this
result may stand because being poor is more important than being labor-abundant in order
to increase per capita emissions of F-Gasses due to more trade with the EU. Remember that
all these former Communist EU members are poorer and labor-abundant as compared to
Canada, and therefore, the above results suggests that in these EU members PHH1 dom-
inates FEH. In other words, the implementation of CETA could help shift F-Gasses from
Canada towards each of these former Communist EU members. Using the same intuition,
one may note that the above results could be true in Malta because PHH1 dominates FEH.
However, the opposite is true for EU members that are rich and capital-abundant as com-
pared to Canada. Here, there are 2 EU members with these characteristics, Finland and
Sweden. Hence, the empirical results of Table 11 imply that, for each of these 2 EU mem-
bers, being capital-abundant is more important than being rich for increasing per capita
22
emissions of F-Gasses due to more trade with Canada. Thus, in Finland and Sweden FEH
dominates PHH1. The results of Table 10 also indicate that although trade elasticities are
mainly positive, they are mainly not statistically significant for Ireland and Luxembourg.
Comparing the trade elasticities of M1 to those of M2 in terms of their magnitude,
sign and statistically significance, there is no empirical evidence in support of PHH2 for
the F-Gasses. It appears that similar to N2O, there is some empirical evidence supporting
the theoretical argument that per capita emissions of F-Gasses would increase in a capital-
abundant but poor EU member due to the presence of CETA, following the channels of FEH
and PHH1. The results of Table 11 empirically validate the latter theoretical claim only for
Spain. However, this is not true for Cyprus, Czech Republic, Greece, and Italy. Looking
at the estimates under M1, Table 11 reports no statistically significant evidence in support
of the theoretical argument that the implementation of CETA should decrease per capita
emissions of F-Gasses in labor abundant and rich EU members (as compared to Canada)
following by the combination of FEH and PHH1.
Comparing the trade elasticities of F-Gasses reported in Table 11 of this study to the
analogous trade elasticities of GHGs presented in Table 4 of Qirjo et al. (2019), one can
see the similarities and differences between them. The main contrast between the results
reported in these 2 Tables is that the results of Table 11 show a positive relationship (how-
ever, mainly statistically insignificant) between per capita emissions of F-Gasses and the
trade intensity variable. However, the results of Table 4 of Qirjo et al. (2019) indicate ro-
bust and statistically significant evidence, regardless of the model or empirical specification
used in their study, implying on average, a negative relationship between per capita emis-
sions of GHGs and the trade intensity variable. However, for F-Gasses, Table 11, similar to
Table 4 of Qirjo et al. (2019) for GHGs, reports negative and statistically significant trade
elasticity estimates for Belgium, Cyprus, and Italy. The results of Table 11 suggest that
the implementation of CETA could help shift F-Gasses from Canada towards some former
Communist EU members (such as Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, and Romania). This movement of F-Gasses from Canada towards these 8 EU mem-
bers could be because these 8 EU members would act as pollution haven when trading
more with Canada since they are poor despite of being labor-abundant. Hence, this result
validates the empirical validity of PHH1 for these 8 former Communist EU members in the
case of F-Gasses. There is no shift of GHGs from Canada towards any EU members. as
reported in Table 4 of Qirjo et al. (2019).
Comparing the results of trade elasticities of the 4 air pollutants as reported in Tables
8-11, it could be worth pointing out the main similarities and differences among them.
Looking at Tables, 8-10, it appears that there is negative and statistically significant evi-
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dence of the relationship between the trade intensity variable and per capita emissions of
CO2, CH4, and N2O, respectively. It seems that on average, in absolute value, trade elas-
ticities of N2O are higher than those of CH4 and the latter are higher than those of CO2.
In other words, the implementation of CETA may help bring down per capita emissions of
N2O more than it can help decrease per capita emissions of CH4 or CO2. Contrary to the
results reported in Tables 9 & 10, the results of Table 8 show that there is no statistically
significant evidence that per capita emissions of CO2 would increase in any CETA member
as a result of more trade between Canada and the EU. The results reported in Tables 9 &
10, show that despite the fact that per capita emissions of CH4, and N2O would go down
due to the implementation of CETA in a typical CETA member, this is not the case for each
CETA member. In particular, there is a statistically significant evidence suggesting that
more trade between Canada and the EU may help increase per capita emissions of CH4
for Bulgaria, Canada, Hungary, Malta , Poland , Romania, and Spain. There is a statis-
tically significant evidence implying that the implementation of CETA may help increase
per capita emissions of N2O for Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Romania, and Spain. Contrary to the results reported in Tables 8-10, the results
of Table 11 show a positive, but mainly statistically insignificant relationship between the
trade intensity variable and per capita emissions of F-Gasses. The results of Table 9 im-
ply that there is empirical evidence in support of PHH2 in the case of Canada for CH4.
Therefore, Canada would act as pollution haven when trading more with the EU for CH4
simply because it is more densely populated than any EU members. Put it differently, the
implementation of CETA may help move per capita emissions of CH4 and CO2 from the EU
towards Canada. The results of Tables 10 & 11 suggest that there is empirical evidence
in support of PHH1 for N2O and F-Gasses. Thus, some former Communist EU members (
such as Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania) will
act as pollution haven when trading more with Canada simply because they are poorer
than Canada, and therefore, may have/adopt lax environmental rules and regulations (or
simply a poor execution of the environmental rules and regulations). In other words, the
implementation of CETA may help increase per capita emissions of N2O and F-Gasses in
these former EU members because pollution would shift from Canada towards these EU
members. The inverse would happen in Canada.
In addition to FEH, PHH1 and PHH2 as measured in M1 & M2, trade between Canada
and a subset of EU members in the sample could be affected by geographical, cultural,
or political reasons. Therefore, per capita emissions of air pollutants could be affected
more (or less) in this subset of CETA members. In order to emphasize these effects, the
study employs M3, where in addition to all variables included in M2, it also employs three
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additional dummy variables.
In particular, the study applies the cross-product of trade with a dummy that is 1 if the
official language is English and/or French, and 0 otherwise. This is denoted by English-
French=1 x Trade and its slopes are reported in the 16th row of the Tables 4-7, respectively.
Since Canada uses both English and French as its official languages, it is expected to trade
more with EU members that use either English or French as their official language as com-
pared to other EU members that use neither English nor French as their official language.
In the sample, there are 6 EU members that use either English or French as one of their
official languages. In the sample, about 47% of all of the volume of trade between the
EU and Canada comes from trade between Canada and these 6 EU members. The results
report statistically significant evidence suggesting that a higher trade intensity between
Canada and the EU members that use either English or French as their official language
may help on average, reduce (increase) per capita emissions of CO2 and CH4, (N2O and
HFCs/PFCs/SF6), respectively. This result for CO2, CH4, and F-Gasses could be interpreted
simply with the role of trade. Since, there is more trade between Canada and the EU mem-
bers that use one of Canada’s official languages, we would see a further decrease (increase)
of emissions per capita of CO2 and CH4 (F-Gasses) in these EU members as compared to
those EU members that use neither English nor French as their official language.
Furthermore, the study employs the cross-product of trade with a dummy that is 1 if a
CETA member has geographically access to the Sea or the Atlantic Ocean, and 0 otherwise.
This is denoted by Sea x Trade and its coefficients are reported in the 17th row of Tables
4-7, respectively. The argument here is analogous to the previous paragraph, and there-
fore, it is expected for Canada to trade more with the EU members that have sea access
relative to the landlocked EU members. In the sample, 96% of the overall volume of trade
between Canada and the EU originates from trade between Canada and EU members that
have access to the sea (there are only 5 landlocked EU members). The results indicate sta-
tistically significant evidence, irrespective of the empirical specification used in the study,
implying that a higher trade insensitive between Canada and the EU members with sea
access increases per capita emissions of CO2 and F-Gasses as compared to the impact of
trade between Canada and landlocked EU members on these 2 pollutants. One may sug-
gest that the later result could be associated with the fact that all landlocked EU members
may be using intensively the ports of EU members that have sea access when trading with
Canada. Therefore, the air pollution could increase in the EU members with sea access
simply because of more trade between landlocked EU members and Canada.
Moreover, the study uses the cross-product of trade with a dummy that is 1 at the time
when an EU member has adopted Euro as its official currency, and 0 otherwise. This is
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denoted by Euro x Trade and its estimators are reported in the 18th row of Tables 4-7, re-
spectively. Analogously, the above two paragraphs, Canada is expected to trade more with
EU members that have adopted Euro as their official currency relative to the EU members
that use their own national official currency, due to lower costs from exchange rates trans-
actions. In the sample, the volume of trade between Canada and the EU members that
have adopted Euro as their official language consists of about 40% of the total volume of
trade between Canada and the EU. One would theoretically expect a negative coefficient
of the Euro dummy for CO2, CH4, and N2O following the main results of the paper (a
negative relationship between the trade intensity variable and per capita emissions of each
of these 3 pollutants). However, in a counter-intuitive way, the results report statistically
significant evidence suggesting that per capita emissions of CO2 and CH4 increase in Eu-
rozone countries due to the implementation of CETA as compared to non-Eurozone EU
members.
The rest of this section previews the results in terms of the control variables used in
the three models. First, in order to empirically validate the existence of the Environmental
Kuznets Curve (EKC), the paper uses the coefficients of income per capita and its square
value, denoted by I and I2, which are presented in rows 6th and 7th of Tables 4-7, respec-
tively. The results yield statistically significant evidence that suggests the existence of a
positive and monotonic relationship between per capita emissions of each of the four air
pollutants and per capita income, respectively. This is inconsistent with the environmental
Kuznets Curve (EKC) argument that suggests an inverted U-shaped relationship between
air pollution and per capita income.8
Second, Tables 4-7 report the direct composition effect of growth captured by the
capital-labor ratio and its squared value to measure its diminishing returns. These are
denoted by KL and (KL)2, and are presented in rows 8th and 9th, respectively. Third, Ta-
bles 4-7 show the general composition effect of growth measured by the cross-product of
income per capita and capital to labor ratio. The later variable is denoted by KL x I and
is presented in rows 10th row. The results show strong statistically significant evidence,
regardless of the model or the empirical methodology used in the paper, in support of
an U-shaped relationship between the direct composition effect of growth and per capita
8These results are consistent with Qirjo et al. (2019) who show the existence of a positive relationship
between per capita income and per capita emissions of GHGs for CETA members. It also consistent with
Pascalau and Qirjo (2017b), who show the same type of relationship between per capita income and per
capita emissions of N2O, using data during 1989-2013 time period for the possible TTIP members. On the
other hand, the results of the current study are opposite to those reported in Pascalau and Qirjo (2017b)
for CO2, CH4, and HFCs/PFCs/SF6, respectively. Pascalau and Qirjo (2017b) show robust and statistically
significant evidence suggesting the presence of the EKC for each of the later three air pollutants, irrespective
of the model or empirical specification employed in the paper.
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emissions of each of the 4 air pollutants, respectively. They also indicate strong and sta-
tistically significant evidence, regardless of the model or the empirical technique used in
the study, suggesting a negative relationship between general composition effect of growth
and per capita emissions of each of the four air pollutants.
Fourth, Tables 4-7 report a land per capita variable, denoted by LPC, in the 14th row,
respectively. In the following row, they also show its squared value denoted by (LPC)2, in
order to capture its diminishing returns. The latter two control variables are present in M2
& M3, but are absent in M1.The results indicate mainly statistically significant evidence
suggesting a positive (negative) relationship of land per capita and emissions per capita
of CH4 and F-Gasses (N2O), respectively. This means that the more sparsely populated is a
typical CETA member, the higher would be emissions per capita of CH4 and F-Gasses.
Fifth, Tables 4-7 present the impact of inward FDI as a portion of GDP on air pollu-
tion in the 13th row. This is denoted by FDI/GDP and it is present in M2 & M3 but it is
absent in M1. There is positive and mainly statistically significant evidence implying that
CETA members with higher inward FDI to GDP ratio tend to also have higher per capita
emissions of CH4 and N2O , respectively. This result empirically validates the theory that
suggests that multinational corporations may chose to transfer their pollution-intensive ac-
tivities in foreign countries in order to take advantage of lower costs due to the existence
of lax environmental rules and regulations in foreign lands as compared to higher costs
associated to stringent environmental rules and regulations in their native countries.
4 Conclusion
This study empirically investigates the impact that a higher trade intensity between each
EU member and Canada could have on each of the following air pollutants: CO2, CH4,
N2O, and HFCs/PFCs/SF6. The paper uses a panel dataset for Canada and 28 EU mem-
bers during the 1990-2016 time period. The study finds robust and statistically significant
evidence suggesting a negative relationship between the trade intensity variable and per
capita emissions of CO2, CH4, and N2O, respectively. In particular, there is robust and
statistically significant evidence suggesting that one percent increase of a percentage point
of the trade intensity variable (proxied by the ratio of the bilateral volume of trade be-
tween Canada and a typical EU member to GDP) may help reduce per capita emissions
of CO2, CH4, and N2O by about .48 percent, .65 percent, and 1.2 percent, respectively.
Thus, the presence of CETA may help reduce more per capita emissions of N2O than CH4,
than CO2. On the other hand, there is some limited empirical evidence that suggests that
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the implementation of CETA may help increase per capita emissions of HFCs/PFCs/SF6. In
particular, there is statistically significant evidence implying that one percent increase of a
percentage point of the trade intensity variable between Canada and the EU may help in-
crease per capita emissions of HFCs/PFCs/SF6 by about 1.95 percent only under M2 when
employing the fixed effects allowing for cross-sectional robust standard errors methodol-
ogy. However, the latter relationship is statistically insignificant under every other model
or empirical techniques used in the study.
The above results stand due to the combinations of FEH, PHH2, and PHH1 channels as
a consequence of more trade between Canada and the EU. More specifically, in the case
of CO2, FEH and PHH2 dominate PHH1 for a typical EU member. Note that an average
EU member is labor-abundant, poor and very densely populated as compared to Canada.
In the latter trade partner, there is no statistically significant evidence suggesting a rela-
tionship between the trade intensity variable and per capita emissions of CO2. In other
words, in the case of Canada, that is capital-abundant, rich and very sparsely populated
as compared to a typical EU member, PHH1 cancels out FEH and PHH2. Thus, there is no
shift of CO2 per capita from the EU towards Canada, despite the fact that there would be
a decrease of emissions per capita of CO2 for an average EU member due to more trade
between these two regions.
In the case of CH4, there is empirical evidence implying that FEH and PHH2 dominate
PHH1 not only for a typical EU member, but also for Canada. Put it differently, there is
a movement of CH4 emissions per capita from the EU towards Canada, as a consequence
of more trade between these two regions. Thus, the implementation of CETA may force
Canada to act as pollution haven for CH4 mainly due to being very sparsely populated as
compared to each EU member (consistent to PHH2 channel).
Focusing on N2O, there is empirical evidence implying that FEH and PHH2 dominate
PHH1 for a typical EU member, but PHH1 dominates FEH and PHH2 in Canada. In other
words, the implementation of CETA may help reduce per capita emissions of N2O not only
in a typical EU member, but also in Canada. The trade elasticities reported in Table 10
suggest that there is a movement of N2O emissions per capita from Canada to 8 former
Communist EU members due to more trade between Canada and the EU. Put it differently,
the implementation of CETA may force these 8 former Communist EU members to act
as pollution havens for N2O due to being much poorer than Canada (consistent to PHH1
channel).
In the case of HFCs/PFCs/SF6, there is limited empirical evidence (only under M2 when
employing the fixed effects with cross-sectional robust standard errors technique) implying
that PHH1 dominates FEH and PHH2 not only for an average EU member, but also for
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Canada. In other words, there is a movement of HFCs/PFCs/SF6 emissions per capita from
Canada towards a typical EU member, as a consequence of more trade between these
two regions. Thus, the implementation of CETA may force a typical EU member to act
as pollution haven for HFCs/PFCs/SF6 due to being poorer than Canada (consistent to
PHH1 channel). However, there is no statistically significant evidence validating the latter
argument for HFCs/PFCs/SF6 under most of the models and empirical strategies used in
this paper. Consequently, on average, PHH1 cancels out FEH and PHH2 for an average EU
member due to more trade with Canada.
This study provides statistically significant evidence in support of PHH1 and PHH2 for
some pollutant. In particular, the trade elasticity of emissions per capita of CH4 coefficients
reported in Table 9, provide unambiguous empirical evidence suggesting that Canada may
act as pollution haven when increasing its trade volumes as a percentage of GDP with
the EU because Canada is extremely sparsely populated as compared to each EU member.
Thus, following PHH2 argument, originated from Frankel and Rose (2005), Canada may
adopt lax environmental rules and regulations, while the EU may adopt stringent environ-
mental rules and regulations (and/or more effective executions of these rules) that lead
to a shift of emissions per capita of CH4 from the EU towards Canada due to the imple-
mentation of CETA. On the other hand, the trade elasticity of emissions per capita of N2O
coefficients reported in Table 10, provide unambiguous empirical evidence suggesting that
8 former Communist EU members may act as pollution havens when increasing their trade
intensity variable with Canada because these 8 EU members are much poorer than Canada.
Thus, following PHH1 argument these 8 former Communist EU members could adopt lax
environmental rules and regulations that leads to a movement of emissions per capita of
N2O from Canada towards these 9 EU members as a consequence of CETA. Analogously to
N2O, the trade elasticity of emissions per capita of HFCs/PFCs/SF6 coefficients reported in
Table 11 provide empirical evidence in support of PHH1 for HFCs/PFCs/SF6. More specif-
ically, the trade elasticities of Table 11 suggest that 8 former Communist EU members
together with Malta may act as pollution haven due to trading more with Canada mainly
because they are much poorer than Canada. Thus, there would be a shift of emissions per
capita of HFCs/PFCs/SF6 from Canada to these 9 EU members.
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Tables and Figures
Table 2: Summary Statistics and Unit Root Tests
Variable Dimension N Mean SD Min Max Unit Root Tests
CO2 tons/capita 783 13.60 25.43 2.99 184.43 -3.834*** †
N2O tons/capita 783 .956 1.50 .09 10.19 -1.959** †
HFC/PFC/SF6 tons/capita 783 .16 .13 2.32e-06 .89 -22.153*** †
CH4 tons/capita 783 1.24 .70 .29 4.23 -1.313* †
Trade (X+M)/GDP 783 0.056% 0.095% 0.003% 0.74% -6.857*** ∗
Rel. K/L CAN = 1 783 0.856 0.365 0.041 1.655 -5.774*** ‡
Rel. I CAN = 1 696 0.725 0.502 0.029 2.519 -2.745*** †
Rel. LPC CAN = 1 783 0.077 0.179 0.002 1 N.A.
I 2011 USD 696 27,894.18 19,931.42 949.97 117,633.5 -2.313** ‡
K/L 2011 USD 783 248,425.3 133,666 88,99.91 690,601.9 -1.400* ‡
FDI/GDP % 783 12.53 47.86 -75.31 731.93 -6.909*** †
LPC Sq.Km/capita 783 0.024 0.056 0.001 0.359 -2.478*** †
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. For all series, we use the
Z-t-tilde-bar statistic of the Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root test where the AR parameter is panel specific. The null states that
all panels contain unit roots, while the alternative states that some panels are stationary. ∗, †, ‡ means that the unit
root test controls for (i) a trend only, (ii) trend and a squared trend term and (iii) trend, a squared trend, and a cubic
trend term, respectively. Relative Land per Capita is stationary around a constant.
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Table 3: Relative (to Canada) Measures of Income, Capital/Labor and Land per Capita
ratios
Country Relative Income Relative K/L ratio Relative LPC ratio
Austria 1.117367 1.127084 0.032709
Belgium 1.045962 1.285901 0.009241
Bulgaria 0.101232 0.146827 0.045332
Canada 1 1 1
Croatia 0.247387 0.585975 0.04072
Cyprus 0.640459 1.136682 0.030083
Czechia 0.337635 1.002536 0.024289
Denmark 1.362923 1.046758 0.0254
Estonia 0.240707 0.483427 0.104469
Finland 1.086206 1.090806 0.205616
France 1.03528 1.032433 0.032846
Germany 1.081756 1.021696 0.013947
Greece 0.560493 1.186642 0.038921
Hungary 0.250218 0.570419 0.029318
Ireland 1.106298 0.987077 0.055093
Italy 0.884257 1.326103 0.016532
Latvia 0.188636 0.628461 0.091297
Lithuania 0.199943 0.388242 0.062963
Luxembourg 2.193493 1.377379 0.017903
Malta 0.441521 0.562086 0.002523
Netherlands 1.159178 0.967618 0.008222
Poland 0.211064 0.321403 0.026071
Portugal 0.496686 0.944284 0.02846
Romania 0.123457 0.285539 0.035586
Slovakia 0.255806 0.586686 0.029074
Slovenia 0.493314 0.846416 0.032077
Spain 0.682424 1.013103 0.037631
Sweden 1.259957 1.053778 0.157782
UK 1.062318 0.843649 0.01283
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Table 4: Dependent Variable CO2 - Base Results
Estimation Method Fixed Effects Random Effects Cross Section Dependence Serial Correlation Effects
Specification M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Trade –196.357*** –184.919** –270.687** –197.996*** –199.685*** –258.011** –196.357** –184.919** –270.687** –292.369*** –272.860*** –408.887**
Trade × RKL 304.584 235.641 135.304 297.697 246.292 141.034 304.584 235.641 135.304 630.897* 520.167 510.407
Trade × (RKL)2 –167.913* –147.647* –133.466 –164.703* –154.606* –137.998 –167.913* –147.647 –133.466 –186.486 –148.871 –158.918
Trade × RI 134.881 204.270 170.893 147.104 226.598 209.747 134.881 204.270 170.893 –163.126 –72.947 –88.065
Trade × (RI)2 –85.319 –131.581** –88.758 –89.228 –138.505** –104.321 –85.319 –131.581 –88.758 44.015 –1.543 28.769
I .946*** .150 .203 .926*** .334 .371 .946*** .150 .203 1.268*** .569* .587*
I2 .112*** .124*** .105*** .113*** .121*** .103*** .112*** .124*** .105*** .111*** .120*** .110***
KL –1.115*** –.850*** –.855*** –1.119*** –.928*** –.921*** –1.115*** –.850** –.855** –.328 –.061 –.092
(KL)2 .143*** .114*** .106*** .142*** .121*** .113*** .143*** .114*** .106*** .108*** .081** .077**
KL × I –.245*** –.198*** –.174*** –.244*** –.208*** –.185*** –.245*** –.198*** –.174*** –.267*** –.224*** –.210***
Trade × RLPC 837.442** 29.742 997.882** 135.099 837.442* 29.742 790.889 –453.126
Trade × (RLPC)2 –773.346* 125.559 –943.137** 10.924 –773.346* 125.559 –740.390 540.370
FDI/GDP .010 .008 .009 .007 .010 .008 .015 .014
LPC .069 –.214 –.066 –.285 .069 –.214 .312 .059
(LPC)2 –.045 –.086*** –.043 –.076*** –.045 –.086*** –.016 –.053
English × Trade –133.580** –137.329** –133.580** –148.747***
Sea × Trade 197.867** 173.870** 197.867** 246.517
Euro × Trade 87.999*** 83.670*** 87.999*** 53.087**
Constant 3.828*** 7.145*** 6.528*** 3.912*** 6.028*** 5.544*** 3.680*** 6.967*** 6.351*** –1.103 2.324 2.031
N 696.000 696.000 696.000 696.000 696.000 696.000 696.000 696.000 696.000 696.000 696.000 696.000
R2 .547 .571 .587 .986 .987 .987
R2 adj. .503 .526 .542
bic –1324.427 –1330.096 –1337.042 . . . . . . . . .
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. M1, M2, and M3 correspond to the three models outlined in equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively. Cross Section Dependence
represents a fixed effects regression where we allow for cross-section dependence among countries. Serial correlation effects denote a fixed effects regression setting with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors where we allow
for an MA(2) component to account for the serial correlation effects in the residuals. GDP per capita is denoted by I and it is calculated as the three-year moving average of the lagged value of GDP per capita,
Iit = 0.6 ∗ Iit−1 + 0.3 ∗ Iit−2 + 0.1 ∗ Iit−3 . All the other variables are in their contemporaneous values. Trade is the sum of exports and imports (between trading partners, the US on one side and each EU member on the
other side) over GDP. All relative variables denoted by R in front of them are constructed relative to the US. KL denotes the capital to labor ratio that also measures the direct composition of growth. FDI/K is the ratio
of the stock of inward FDI to the physical stock of capital. It is also used as a proxy to measure PHH. LPC denotes the land area per capita. KL × I denotes the general composition of growth. Trade × RKL and Trade
× (RKL)2 measure FEH. Trade × RI and Trade × (RI)2 measure PHH1. Trade × RLPC and Trade × (RLPC)2 measure PHH2. English × Trade is a dummy variable. If a country uses English as one of their official
languages, we put the value of our Trade variable otherwise we put zero. Sea × Trade is a dummy variable. If a country has access to the sea or the ocean, we put the value of our Trade variable otherwise we put zero.
Euro × Trade is a dummy variable. If the country uses Euro as its national currency, we put the value of our Trade variable otherwise we put zero.
Table 5: Dependent Variable (CH4) - Base Results
Estimation Method Fixed Effects Random Effects Cross Section Dependence Serial Correlation Effects
Specification M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Trade –65.997 96.471 237.731** –87.307 68.577 189.862* –65.997 96.471 237.731** –150.531 2.952 83.907
Trade × RKL 155.478 –140.906 –239.305 173.355 –66.271 –156.036 155.478 –140.906 –239.305 450.561 150.622 78.394
Trade × (RKL)2 –268.574*** –139.423* –116.020 –271.119*** –167.979** –147.086* –268.574*** –139.423 –116.020 –333.368** –202.995* –187.713*
Trade × RI 227.565* 183.755 253.280* 255.698* 174.681 241.018* 227.565* 183.755 253.280* –2.510 –27.062 26.425
Trade × (RI)2 –71.162 –51.210 –79.305 –76.703 –49.212 –73.519 –71.162 –51.210 –79.305 44.740 60.681 43.831
I 1.871*** 1.467*** 1.451*** 1.954*** 1.691*** 1.686*** 1.871*** 1.467*** 1.451*** 2.506*** 2.192*** 2.176***
I2 .098*** .101*** .096*** .096*** .096*** .091*** .098*** .101*** .096*** .074*** .076*** .071***
KL –3.262*** –3.083*** –3.057*** –3.268*** –3.173*** –3.148*** –3.262*** –3.083*** –3.057*** –2.742*** –2.583*** –2.563***
(KL)2 .262*** .244*** .241*** .264*** .252*** .249*** .262*** .244*** .241*** .240*** .225*** .221***
KL × I –.299*** –.269*** –.262*** –.303*** –.282*** –.274*** –.299*** –.269*** –.262*** –.318*** –.295*** –.286***
Trade × RLPC –606.264 –959.276 –558.784 –1024.108* –606.264* –959.276** –647.469** –1266.786***
Trade × (RLPC)2 776.790** 1178.461* 688.034* 1200.656** 776.790** 1178.461** 788.395** 1449.903***
FDI/GDP .052*** .051*** .052*** .051*** .052*** .051*** .049*** .048***
LPC .590** .539* .145 .103 .590*** .539** .832*** .741**
(LPC)2 .034 .029 –.005 –.009 .034 .029 .064** .054*
English × Trade –67.546 –76.916 –67.546 –90.030**
Sea × Trade –84.771 –58.629 –84.771 –10.510
Euro × Trade 34.940* 34.649* 34.940 36.582
Constant 9.002*** 11.657*** 11.359*** 8.766*** 10.046*** 9.764*** 8.722*** 11.459*** 11.114*** 4.425*** 7.279*** 6.984***
N 696.000 696.000 696.000 696.000 696.000 696.000 696.000 696.000 696.000 696.000 696.000 696.000
R2 .703 .733 .735 .974 .976 .977
R2 adj. .674 .705 .706
BIC –1415.335 –1457.712 –1443.661 . . . . . . . . .
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. M1, M2, and M3 correspond to the three models outlined in equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively. Cross Section
Dependence represents a fixed effects regression where we allow for cross-section dependence among countries. Serial correlation effects denote a fixed effects regression setting with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors
where we allow for an MA(2) component to account for the serial correlation effects in the residuals. GDP per capita is denoted by I and it is calculated as the three-year moving average of the lagged value of
GDP per capita, Iit = 0.6 ∗ Iit−1 + 0.3 ∗ Iit−2 + 0.1 ∗ Iit−3 . All the other variables are in their contemporaneous values. Trade is the sum of exports and imports (between trading partners, the US on one side and
each EU member on the other side) over GDP. All relative variables denoted by R in front of them are constructed relative to the US. KL denotes the capital to labor ratio that also measures the direct composition
of growth. FDI/K is the ratio of the stock of inward FDI to the physical stock of capital. It is also used as a proxy to measure PHH. LPC denotes the land area per capita. KL × I denotes the general composition of
growth. Trade × RKL and Trade × (RKL)2 measure FEH. Trade × RI and Trade × (RI)2 measure PHH1. Trade × RLPC and Trade × (RLPC)2 measure PHH2. English × Trade is a dummy variable. If a country
uses English as one of their official languages, we put the value of our Trade variable otherwise we put zero. Sea × Trade is a dummy variable. If a country has access to the sea or the ocean, we put the value of
our Trade variable otherwise we put zero. Euro × Trade is a dummy variable. If the country uses Euro as its national currency, we put the value of our Trade variable otherwise we put zero.
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Table 6: Dependent Variable (N2O) - Base Results
Estimation Method Fixed Effects Random Effects Cross Section Dependence Serial Correlation Effects
Specification M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Trade 13.798 26.767 –107.632 4.861 14.138 –101.860 13.798 26.767 –107.632 –16.960 1.467 –181.743
Trade × RKL 240.719 201.713 218.078 238.106 201.488 228.449 240.719 201.713 218.078 367.782 316.153 341.537
Trade × (RKL)2 –295.701*** –296.231*** –290.608*** –292.717*** –297.361*** –295.895*** –295.701*** –296.231*** –290.608*** –340.404** –334.209** –332.836*
Trade × RI –153.429 –94.684 –217.633 –128.678 –68.178 –175.913 –153.429 –94.684 –217.633 –269.695 –225.643** –357.495**
Trade × (RI)2 36.027 –25.199 26.387 27.604 –33.303 9.679 36.027 –25.199 26.387 130.010* 87.875** 148.789**
I 1.396*** .264 .231 1.399*** .444 .418 1.396*** .264 .231 2.045*** 1.141*** 1.117***
I2 .061*** .077*** .077*** .062*** .074*** .075*** .061** .077*** .077*** .030 .040 .037
KL –1.378*** –1.057*** –1.056*** –1.384*** –1.123*** –1.126*** –1.378*** –1.057*** –1.056*** –1.198** –.880** –.885**
(KL)2 .139*** .100*** .098*** .139*** .107*** .106*** .139*** .100*** .098*** .131*** .095** .093**
KL × I –.197*** –.128*** –.124*** –.198*** –.138*** –.137*** –.197*** –.128*** –.124*** –.208*** –.149*** –.144**
Trade × RLPC 1290.611** 2398.395*** 1448.608*** 2475.487*** 1290.611** 2398.395*** 1127.392 2022.907*
Trade × (RLPC)2 –1155.896** –2264.772*** –1314.977*** –2352.411*** –1155.896* –2264.772*** –1000.358 –1895.673*
FDI/GDP .016* .017* .015 .016* .016*** .017*** .018*** .019***
LPC –.434 –.398 –.507* –.480 –.434* –.398* –.190 –.204
(LPC)2 –.121*** –.121*** –.112*** –.112*** –.121*** –.121*** –.087*** –.095***
English × Trade 126.509* 120.205* 126.509* 101.726
Sea × Trade 53.338 35.733 53.338 119.399
Euro × Trade –9.880 –14.703 –9.880 –2.969
Constant –.028 3.717** 4.080** –.010 2.709* 3.015** –.483 3.154* 3.565** –2.979* .304 .600
N 696.000 696.000 696.000 696.000 696.000 696.000 696.000 696.000 696.000 696.000 696.000 696.000
R2 .650 .681 .683 .980 .982 .982
R2 adj. .616 .647 .648
BIC –1024.184 –1055.986 –1040.971 . . . . . . . . .
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. M1, M2, and M3 correspond to the three models outlined in equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively. Cross Section Dependence
represents a fixed effects regression where we allow for cross-section dependence among countries. Serial correlation effects denote a fixed effects regression setting with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors where we allow
for an MA(2) component to account for the serial correlation effects in the residuals. GDP per capita is denoted by I and it is calculated as the three-year moving average of the lagged value of GDP per capita, Iit =
0.6 ∗ Iit−1 + 0.3 ∗ Iit−2 + 0.1 ∗ Iit−3 . All the other variables are in their contemporaneous values. Trade is the sum of exports and imports (between trading partners, the US on one side and each EU member on the other side)
over GDP. All relative variables denoted by R in front of them are constructed relative to the US. KL denotes the capital to labor ratio that also measures the direct composition of growth. FDI/K is the ratio of the stock of inward
FDI to the physical stock of capital. It is also used as a proxy to measure PHH. LPC denotes the land area per capita. KL × I denotes the general composition of growth. Trade × RKL and Trade × (RKL)2 measure FEH. Trade
× RI and Trade × (RI)2 measure PHH1. Trade × RLPC and Trade × (RLPC)2 measure PHH2. English × Trade is a dummy variable. If a country uses English as one of their official languages, we put the value of our Trade
variable otherwise we put zero. Sea × Trade is a dummy variable. If a country has access to the sea or the ocean, we put the value of our Trade variable otherwise we put zero. Euro × Trade is a dummy variable. If the country
uses Euro as its national currency, we put the value of our Trade variable otherwise we put zero.
Table 7: Dependent Variable HFC/PFC/SF6 (F-Gasses) - Base Results
Estimation Method Fixed Effects Random Effects Cross Section Dependence Serial Correlation Effects
Specification M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Trade 674.797 439.328 571.245 173.973 147.790 217.505 674.797* 439.328 571.245 423.036 170.603 275.627
Trade × RKL –26.338 –442.766 –735.748 294.682 44.214 –257.703 –26.338 –442.766 –735.748 730.407 343.955 13.223
Trade × (RKL)2 –408.186 –264.263 –142.939 –540.468 –493.796 –411.765 –408.186 –264.263 –142.939 –607.161 –488.919 –347.919
Trade × RI –1030.637 –76.653 –313.881 10.094 373.404 209.312 –1030.637 –76.653 –313.881 –1437.755** –452.070 –722.460
Trade × (RI)2 640.771* 315.801 386.219 107.725 –50.787 62.871 640.771** 315.801 386.219 797.252*** 449.138 540.077
I 12.050*** 11.041*** 10.574*** 13.363*** 13.128*** 12.921*** 12.050*** 11.041*** 10.574*** 12.589*** 11.699*** 11.162***
I2 .106 .118 .104 .036 .014 –.010 .106** .118** .104* .051 .067 .051
KL –18.975*** –17.769*** –17.267*** –19.515*** –19.336*** –18.966*** –18.975*** –17.769*** –17.267*** –17.452*** –16.544*** –15.905***
(KL)2 1.178*** 1.105*** 1.063*** 1.204*** 1.181*** 1.147*** 1.178*** 1.105*** 1.063*** 1.090*** 1.038*** .986***
KL × I –1.051*** –.992*** –.933*** –1.064*** –1.016*** –.963*** –1.051*** –.992*** –.933*** –1.017*** –.976*** –.906***
Trade × RLPC 5459.331** 11070.314*** 3352.445 5161.864 5459.331*** 11070.314*** 5248.979** 11173.393***
Trade × (RLPC)2 –5670.628** –11121.414*** –3338.101 –4907.874 –5670.628*** –11121.414*** –5500.251** –11231.087***
FDI/GDP .074 .075 .065 .065 .074 .075 .070 .072
LPC 5.162*** 5.420*** .375 .455 5.162*** 5.420*** 5.211* 5.438**
(LPC)2 .564*** .594*** .049 .060 .564*** .594*** .582* .607*
English × Trade 521.459 9.368 521.459** 526.714*
Sea × Trade –470.650 –68.174 –470.650* –446.423*
Euro × Trade 40.118 189.711 40.118 63.536
Constant 50.634*** 59.551*** 59.139*** 48.822*** 49.292*** 48.057*** 50.612*** 60.173*** 59.764*** 40.972** 50.703*** 49.804**
N 661.000 661.000 661.000 661.000 661.000 661.000 661.000 661.000 661.000 661.000 661.000 661.000
R2 .594 .607 .609 .781 .788 .790
R2 adj. .552 .564 .564
BIC 1062.499 1072.458 1088.178 . . . . . . . . .
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. M1, M2, and M3 correspond to the three models outlined in equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively. Cross Section Dependence represents a
fixed effects regression where we allow for cross-section dependence among countries. Serial correlation effects denote a fixed effects regression setting with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors where we allow for an MA(2) component
to account for the serial correlation effects in the residuals. GDP per capita is denoted by I and it is calculated as the three-year moving average of the lagged value of GDP per capita, Iit = 0.6 ∗ Iit−1 + 0.3 ∗ Iit−2 + 0.1 ∗ Iit−3 . All
the other variables are in their contemporaneous values. Trade is the sum of exports and imports (between trading partners, the US on one side and each EU member on the other side) over GDP. All relative variables denoted
by R in front of them are constructed relative to the US. KL denotes the capital to labor ratio that also measures the direct composition of growth. FDI/K is the ratio of the stock of inward FDI to the physical stock of capital. It is
also used as a proxy to measure PHH. LPC denotes the land area per capita. KL × I denotes the general composition of growth. Trade × RKL and Trade × (RKL)2 measure FEH. Trade × RI and Trade × (RI)2 measure PHH1.
Trade × RLPC and Trade × (RLPC)2 measure PHH2. English × Trade is a dummy variable. If a country uses English as one of their official languages, we put the value of our Trade variable otherwise we put zero. Sea × Trade
is a dummy variable. If a country has access to the sea or the ocean, we put the value of our Trade variable otherwise we put zero. Euro × Trade is a dummy variable. If the country uses Euro as its national currency, we put the
value of our Trade variable otherwise we put zero.
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Table 8: Trade Elasticity of CO2 Coefficients
Estimation Method M1 (FE) M1 (RE) M1 (CSD) M2 (FE) M2 (RE) M2 (CSD) M3 (FE) M3 (RE) M3 (CSD)
(1) ( 2) ( 3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Trade
Austria –0.279 –0.245 –0.279 –0.233 –0.137 –0.233 –1.395 –1.034 –1.394*
Belgium –0.492 –0.456 –0.492 –0.638* –0.597 –0.638* –1.244*** –1.187*** –1.244***
Bulgaria –1.408*** –1.423*** –1.401** –0.962** –1.002** –0.962* –0.380 –0.402 –0.380
Canada –0.101 –0.071 –0.101 0.400 0.348 0.399 0.329 0.330 0.329
Croatia –0.508** –0.525** –0.508* –0.257 –0.253 –0.257 –0.073 –4.098 –0.073
Cyprus –0.187 –0.177 –0.187 –0.099 –0.054 –0.100 0.125 0.219 0.125
Czechia –0.267 –0.283 –0.267 –0.263 –0.269 –0.263 –2.255*** –1.979** –2.255***
Denmark –0.447 –0.406 –0.447 –0.555 –0.456 –0.555 –0.185 –0.027 –0.185
Estonia –0.633*** –0.648*** –0.633** 0.134 0.222 0.134 0.193 0.268 0.193
Finland –0.204 –0.171 –0.204 1.007 1.311* 1.008 0.706 0.974 0.707
France –0.217 –0.185 –0.217 –0.117 –0.246 –0.117 –0.698** –0.606* –0.698**
Germany –0.194 –0.161 –0.194 –0.270 –0.201 –0.270 0.668 0.781 0.668
Greece –0.281 –0.276 –0.281 –0.141 –0.098 –0.141 0.209 0.280 0.209
Hungary –0.505** –0.522** –0.505* –0.337 –0.350 –0.337 –2.030** –1.768** –2.030***
Ireland –0.371 –0.335 –0.371 –0.119 0.005 –0.119 –0.780* –0.670 –0.780*
Italy –0.462 –0.434 –0.462 –0.523 –0.487 –52.297 0.072 0.157 0.072
Latvia –0.803*** –0.819*** –0.803*** –0.308 –0.288 –0.308 –0.026 0.005 –0.026
Lithuania –0.572* –0.596* –0.572 0.020 0.008 0.020 –0.056 –0.007 –0.056
Luxembourg –2.200** –2.172** –2.200 –3.254*** –3.201*** –3.255** –4.661*** –4.502*** –4.661***
Malta –0.346*** –0.345*** –0.346*** –0.327*** –0.348*** –0.327** –0.832*** –0.838*** –0.832***
Nederlands –0.237 –0.201 –0.237 –0.361 –0.294 –0.361 0.709 0.823 0.709
Poland –0.897*** –0.909*** –0.897*** –0.646** –0.680** –0.646* –0.098 –0.095 –0.098
Portugal –0.222 –0.222 –0.222 –0.114 –0.088 –0.114 0.540 0.590 0.540
Romania –1.080*** –1.100*** –1.080*** –0.784** –0.826** –0.784* –0.273 –0.291 –0.273
Slovakia –0.171 –0.172 –0.171 –0.009 0.024 –0.009 0.321 0.394 0.321
Slovenia –0.185 –0.171 –0.185 0.002 0.064 0.002 0.650 0.740 0.650
Spain –0.475** –0.493** –0.475 –0.317 –0.330 –0.317 –1.711** –1.464* –1.711**
Sweden –0.301 –0.263 –0.301 0.578 0.847 0.578 –0.011 0.263 –0.011
UK –0.165 –13.149 –0.165 –0.185 –0.115 –0.185 –1.122*** –1.011*** –1.122***
Average -0.490*** -0.480*** -0.490*** -0.299 -0.248 -0.299 -0.459* -0.348 -0.459*
Note: The entries in this table are elasticities. The average Trade to GDP ratio in the sample is around 0.057%. Thus, in response to a 0.01%
percentage point increase in Trade, CO2 per capita in Bulgaria should decrease by approximately 1.40% (i.e., exp(0.0001∗ǫ)-1;ǫ is one of the
elasticity coefficients in the table). Columns (1), (2), and (3) show coefficients of Trade elasticities using Model 1 (M1) under Fixed Effects (FE),
Random Effects (RE), and Fixed Effects with Cross-Sectional Dependence Robust Standard Error Terms (CSD), respectively. Columns (4), (5), and
(6) indicate Trade elasticities for CO2 using Model 2 (M2) under Fixed Effects (FE), Random Effects (RE), and Fixed Effects with Cross-Sectional
Dependence Robust Standard Error Terms (CSD), respectively. Columns (7), (8), and (9) indicate Trade elasticities for CO2 Model 3 (M3) under
Fixed Effects (FE), Random Effects (RE), and Fixed Effects with Cross-Sectional Dependence Robust Standard Error Terms (CSD), respectively. ***,
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. The study employs the Delta method to compute the Trade
elasticities. The last row reports the average Trade elasticities for CO2 across all CETA members.
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Table 9: Trade Elasticity of CH4 Coefficients
Estimation Method M1 (FE) M1 (RE) M1 (CSD) M2 (FE) M2 (RE) M2 (CSD) M3 (FE) M3 (RE) M3 (CSD)
(1) ( 2) ( 3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Trade
Austria –0.807*** –0.602** –0.807*** –1.296*** –1.159*** –1.296*** –0.166 –0.177 –0.166
Belgium –1.829*** –1.616*** –1.829*** –2.097*** –1.971*** –2.097*** –2.457*** –2.297*** –2.457***
Bulgaria –0.281 –0.439 –0.281 0.606 0.448 0.606 0.931** 0.796* 0.931
Canada –0.226 –0.061 –0.227 1.192*** 0.890** 1.192*** 1.232*** 0.952** 1.232***
Croatia –0.319 –0.365* –0.319 –0.316 –0.257 –0.316 –0.245 –0.132 –0.245
Cyprus –1.261*** –1.142*** –1.261*** –1.694*** –1.533*** –1.694*** –1.583*** –1.333*** –1.583**
Czechia –1.234*** –1.201*** –1.234*** –1.548*** –1.382*** –1.548*** –0.778 –0.783 –0.778
Denmark –0.381 –0.151 –0.381 –0.790** –0.679* –0.790** –0.675 –0.438 –0.675
Estonia –0.141 –0.207 –0.141 –0.303 –0.265 –0.303 –0.267 –0.244 –0.267
Finland –0.622** –0.430* –0.622** –1.849*** –1.668** –1.849*** –1.961*** –1.831** –1.961***
France –0.517** –0.338 –0.517** –0.963*** –0.841*** –0.963*** –1.278*** –1.155*** –1.278***
Germany –0.357 –0.172 –0.357 –0.731*** –0.611** –0.731** –0.308 –0.071 –0.308
Greece –1.706*** –1.597*** –1.706*** –2.165*** –1.992*** –2.165*** –2.040*** –1.788*** –2.040***
Hungary –0.240 –0.288 –0.240 –0.161 –0.112 –0.161 0.808 0.661 0.808*
Ireland –0.559** –0.375 –0.559** –1.032*** –0.925*** –1.032*** –1.394*** –1.306*** –1.394***
Italy –2.150*** –1.961*** –2.150*** –2.461*** –2.317*** –2.461*** –2.201*** –1.943*** –2.201***
Latvia –0.101 –0.193 –0.101 0.116 0.099 0.116 0.266 0.268 0.266
Lithuania –0.055* –0.610** –0.553* –0.811** –0.721** –0.811*** –0.908*** –0.812** –0.908***
Luxembourg –2.112** –1.777* –2.112*** –2.200** –2.089** –2.200*** –2.021* –2.037* –2.021**
Malta 0.169** 0.164* 0.169 0.346*** 0.368*** 0.346** 0.117 0.138 0.117
Netherlands –0.126 0.064 –0.126 –0.423 –0.326 –0.423 0.063 0.286 0.063
Poland 0.007 –0.092 0.007 0.557** 0.486** 0.557* 0.868** 0.850** 0.868**
Portugal –0.919*** –0.854*** –0.919*** –1.230*** –1.093*** –1.230*** –0.952** –0.735* –0.952
Romania –0.249 –0.377 –0.249 0.357 0.280 0.357 0.603* 0.568 0.603
Slovakia –0.500** –0.451** –0.500* –0.807*** –0.683*** –0.807*** –0.642 –0.443 –0.642
Slovenia –0.902*** –0.790*** –0.902*** –1.321*** –1.182*** –1.321*** –1.010** –0.796* –1.010*
Spain –0.176 –0.226 –0.176 –0.119 –0.065 –0.119 0.962 0.820 0.962**
Sweden –0.386 –0.171 –0.386 –1.450** –1.286** –1.450*** –1.706*** –1.547** –1.706***
UK 0.222 0.382 0.222 –0.045 0.035 –0.045 –0.046 –0.358 –0.460
Average -0.635*** -0.552*** -0.635*** -0.794*** -0.722*** -0.794*** -0.614*** -0.534** -0.614***
Note: The entries in this table are elasticities. The average Trade to GDP ratio in the sample is around 0.057%. Thus, in response to a 0.01%
percentage point increase in Trade, CH4 per capita in Austria should decrease by approximately 0.81% (i.e., exp(0.0001∗ǫ)-1;ǫ is one of the elasticity
coefficients in the table). Columns (1), (2), and (3) show coefficients of Trade elasticities for CH4 using Model 1 (M1) under Fixed Effects (FE),
Random Effects (RE), and Fixed Effects with Cross-Sectional Dependence Robust Standard Error Terms (CSD), respectively. Columns (4), (5), and
(6) indicate Trade elasticities for CH4 using Model 2 (M2) under Fixed Effects (FE), Random Effects (RE), and Fixed Effects with Cross-Sectional
Dependence Robust Standard Error Terms (CSD), respectively. Columns (7), (8), and (9) indicate Trade elasticities for CH4 using Model 3 (M3)
under Fixed Effects (FE), Random Effects (RE), and Fixed Effects with Cross-Sectional Dependence Robust Standard Error Terms (CSD), respectively.
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. The study employs the Delta method to compute the Trade
elasticities of CH4. The last row reports the average Trade elasticity for CH4 across all CETA members.
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Table 10: Trade Elasticity of N2O Coefficients
Estimation Method M1 (FE) M1 (RE) M1 (CSD) M2 (FE) M2 (RE) M2 (CSD) M3 (FE) M3 (RE) M3 (CSD)
(1) ( 2) ( 3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Trade
Austria –2.307*** –2.216*** –2.307*** –2.346*** –2.245*** –2.346*** –3.848*** –3.505*** –3.848***
Belgium –3.207*** –3.111*** –3.207*** –3.555*** –3.502*** –3.555*** –3.467*** –3.381*** –3.467***
Bulgaria 0.279 0.210 0.279 0.971* 0.939* 0.971 0.563 0.533 0.563
Canada –1.585*** –1.508*** –1.585*** –0.529 –0.495 –0.529* –0.579 –0.565 –0.579**
Croatia 0.002 –0.033 0.002 0.509* 0.501* 0.509* –0.011 0.037 –0.011
Cyprus –1.878*** –1.832*** –1.878*** –1.711*** –1.671*** –1.711*** –2.559*** –2.424*** –2.559***
Czechia –1.023* –1.033* –1.023** –0.862 –0.884* –0.862** –2.070* –1.821* –2.070**
Denmark –2.180*** –2.083*** –2.180*** –2.516*** –2.409*** –2.516*** –3.513*** –3.309*** –3.513***
Estonia 0.163 0.123 0.163 1.442*** 1.521*** 1.442** 1.504*** 1.573*** 1.504**
Finland –2.070*** –1.983*** –2.070*** –0.283 0.024 –0.283 0.180 0.452 0.180
France –1.921*** –1.838*** –1.921*** –1.860*** –1.764*** –1.860*** –1.600*** –1.494*** –1.600***
Germany –1.816*** –1.733*** –1.816*** –2.029*** –1.957*** –2.029*** –3.238*** –3.080*** –3.238***
Greece –2.108*** –2.071*** –2.108*** –1.840*** –1.801*** –1.840*** –2.549*** –2.440*** –2.549***
Hungary 0.068 0.032 0.068 0.445* 0.421 0.445* –0.735 –0.519 –0.735
Ireland –2.059*** –1.974*** –2.059*** –1.800*** –1.668*** –1.800*** –1.314** –1.197** –1.314***
Italy –3.226*** –3.142*** –3.226*** –3.396*** –3.350*** –3.396*** –4.447*** –4.311*** –4.447***
Latvia 0.290 0.240 0.290 1.132*** 1.147*** 1.132** 0.840** 0.871** 0.840
Lithuania –0.071 –0.055 –0.007 1.059** 1.107** 1.059* 1.101** 1.156** 1.101**
Luxembourg –3.804*** –3.740*** –3.804*** –5.725*** –5.662*** –5.725*** –5.525*** –5.413*** –5.525***
Malta –0.099 –0.100 –0.099 –0.027 –0.054 –0.027 0.092 0.088 0.092
Netherlands –1.742*** –1.654*** –1.742*** –2.052*** –1.987*** –2.059*** –3.361*** –3.202*** –3.361***
Poland 0.292 0.247 0.292 0.722** 0.687** 0.722 0.019 0.030 0.019
Portugal –1.210*** –1.191*** –1.210*** –0.970*** –0.953*** –0.970*** –1.815*** –1.732*** –1.815***
Romania 0.337 0.271 0.337 0.859** 0.817** 0.859 0.355 0.336 0.355
Slovakia –0.782*** –0.769*** –0.782*** –0.454 –0.431 –0.454* –1.239** –1.135** –1.239**
Slovenia –1.634*** –1.586*** –1.634*** –1.337*** –1.277*** –1.337*** –2.191*** –2.066*** –2.191***
Spain 0.150 0.112 0.150 0.520* 0.494* 0.520* –0.694 –0.495 –0.694
Sweden –2.064*** –1.970*** –2.064*** –0.836 –0.563 –0.836 –0.647 —0.357 –0.647
UK –1.278*** –1.200*** –1.278*** –1.414*** –1.342*** –1.414*** –1.347*** –1.217** –1.347***
Average -1.256*** -1.227*** -1.256*** -0.961*** -0.909*** -0.961*** -1.451*** -1.330*** -1.451***
Note: The entries in this table are elasticities. The average Trade to GDP ratio in the sample is around 0.057%. Thus, in response to a 0.01%
percentage point increase in Trade, N2O per capita in Austria should decrease by approximately 2.307% (i.e., exp(0.0001∗ǫ)-1;ǫ is one of the
elasticity coefficients in the table). Columns (1), (2), and (3) show coefficients of Trade elasticities for N2O using Model 1 (M1) under Fixed Effects
(FE), Random Effects (RE), and Fixed Effects with Cross-Sectional Dependence Robust Standard Error Terms (CSD), respectively. Columns (4), (5),
and (6) indicate Trade elasticities for N2O using Model 2 (M2) under Fixed Effects (FE), Random Effects (RE), and Fixed Effects with Cross-Sectional
Dependence Robust Standard Error Terms (CSD), respectively. Columns (7), (8), and (9) indicate Trade elasticities for N2O using Model 3 (M3)
under Fixed Effects (FE), Random Effects (RE), and Fixed Effects with Cross-Sectional Dependence Robust Standard Error Terms (CSD), respectively.
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. The study employs the Delta method to compute the Trade
elasticities of N2O. The last row reports the average Trade elasticity of N2O across all CETA Members.
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Table 11: Trade Elasticity of HFC/PFC/SF6 (F-Gasses) Coefficients
Estimation Method M1 (FE) M1 (RE) M1 (CSD) M2 (FE) M2 (RE) M2 (CSD) M3 (FE) M3 (RE) M3 (CSD)
(1) ( 2) ( 3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Trade
Austria –2.376 –0.585 –2.376* 0.713 0.020 0.713 0.410 –3.505*** 0.410
Belgium –4.582** –2.749* –4.582*** –2.945 –3.128 –2.945* –3.722 –3.381*** –3.722**
Bulgaria 5.351** 2.134 5.351** 5.888** 3.375 5.888** 4.331 0.533 4.331*
Canada –1.495 0.460 –1.495 –2.398 0.351 –2.398** –2.353 –0.565 –2.353**
Croatia 2.446* 1.275 2.446* 2.525* 1.797 2.525* –0.520 0.037 –0.520
Cyprus –3.228* –1.758 –3.228* –2.023 –1.651 –2.02 –6.658** –2.424*** –6.658**
Czechia –0.620 –0.830 –0.620 –1.540 –1.312 –1.540 –1.315 –1.821* –1.315
Denmark –0.258 0.743 –0.258 2.883 1.145 2.883* –2.736 –3.309*** –2.736
Estonia 3.391*** 1.780* 3.391*** 6.615*** 4.357** 6.615*** 7.048*** 1.573*** 7.048***
Finland –2.183 –0.283 –2.183* 8.010* 4.849 8.010*** 10.770** 0.452 10.770***
France –1.873 –5.877 –1.873 1.134 0.682 1.134 1.666 –1.494*** 1.666
Germany –1.386 0.349 –1.386 0.688 0.471 0.688 –5.076 –3.080*** –5.076
Greece –3.423 –2.316 –3.423 –2.238 –2.103 –2.238 –6.115* –2.440*** –6.115**
Hungary 2.822** 1.507 2.822** 2.311* 1.711 2.311* 3.416 –0.519 3.412*
Ireland –1.479 .325 –1.479 2.807 1.443 2.807* 4.506* –1.197** 4.506***
Italy –5.310** –3.469* –5.310*** –3.866 –3.761* –3.866** –9.281** –4.311*** –9.281***
Latvia 3.700*** 1.973** 3.700*** 5.207*** 3.532** 5.207*** 3.849** 0.871** 3.849**
Lithuania 2.348 0.832 2.348 4.457* 2.672 4.457** 4.206* 1.156** 4.206**
Luxembourg 7.467 1.055 7.467** 8.147 –0.971 8.147** 12.460* –5.413*** 12.460***
Malta 1.525*** 1.674*** 1.525** 0.927 1.419** 0.927 0.795 8.802 0.795
Netherlands –0.787 0.862 –0.787 1.319 0.933 1.319 –4.792 –3.202*** –4.792
Poland 4.214** 2.187 4.214*** 4.004** 2.736 4.004** 0.734 0.030 0.734
Portugal –1.268 –0.580 –1.268 –0.743 –0.469 –0.743 –4.923 –1.732*** –4.923*
Romania 5.025** 2.012 5.025*** 4.565** 2.618 4.565** 2.115 0.336 2.115
Slovakia –0.273 0.307 –0.273 0.472 0.667 0.472 –3.618 –1.135** –3.618
Slovenia –2.274 –0.823 –2.274 –0.341 –0.212 –0.341 –4.323 –2.066*** –4.323*
Spain 2.992** 1.656 2.992** 2.400* 1.830 2.400* 3.604 –0.495 3.604*
Sweden –1.034 0.463 –1.034 7.858** 4.575 7.858*** 8.414** –0.357 8.414***
UK –0.179 1.496 –0.179 2.076 1.882 2.076 1.290 –1.217** 1.290
Average 0.133 0.271 0.133 1.95 0.95 1.95** 0.410 0.398 0.410
Note: The entries in this table are elasticities. The average Trade to GDP ratio in the sample is around 0.057%. Thus, in response to a 0.01%
percentage point increase in Trade, HFC/PFC/SF6 per capita in Cyprus should decrease by approximately 3.228% (i.e., exp(0.0001∗ǫ)-1;ǫ is
one of the elasticity coefficients in the table). Columns (1), (2), and (3) show coefficients of Trade elasticities for HFC/PFC/SF6 using Model 1
(M1) under Fixed Effects (FE), Random Effects (RE), and Fixed Effects with Cross-Sectional Dependence Robust Standard Error Terms (CSD),
respectively. Columns (4), (5), and (6) indicate Trade elasticities for HFC/PFC/SF6 using Model 2 (M2) under Fixed Effects (FE), Random
Effects (RE), and Fixed Effects with Cross-Sectional Dependence Robust Standard Error Terms (CSD), respectively. Columns (7), (8), and
(9) indicate Trade elasticities for HFC/PFC/SF6 using Model 3 (M3) under Fixed Effects (FE), Random Effects (RE), and Fixed Effects with
Cross-Sectional Dependence Robust Standard Error Terms (CSD), respectively. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
significance level, respectively. The study employs the Delta method to compute the Trade elasticities of HFC/PFC/SF6. The last row reports
the average Trade elasticity for HFC/PFC/SF6 across all CETA members.
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